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Abstract
This dissertation consists of two essays on tactical issues in retailing.
The first essay compares the price sensitivity of private label and national brand
products. A large-scale field experiment shows that private label demand is less price
sensitive than national brand demand. The estimates from the experimental study
are then compared with estimates using the same retailer's transaction history. This
allows the evaluation of several methods for controlling for the endogeneity of prices in
non-experimental studies. Measuring price sensitivity in the historical data without
accounting for endogeneity performs poorly. Instrumental variables estimates with
commodity prices as instruments and regression discontinuity estimates also differ
from the experimental benchmark. However, estimates using wholesale prices as an
instrument closely replicate the experimental estimates. These findings indicate that
the wholesale price is an effective instrument for retail price.
The second essay shows how targeted offers can affect customer search activity.
It has become common practice for retailers to personalize direct marketing offers
based on customer transaction histories. Targeted email offers featuring products
similar to a customer's previous purchases generate higher response rates, but also
have the potential to affect customer search behavior. A closely matched offer may
encourage a customer to start the search process, leading to increased search activity.
Alternatively, providing customers with closely matched offers may weaken their in-
centives to search beyond the targeted items. In a field experiment using email offers
sent by an online wine retailer, targeted offers result in less search activity on the
retailer's website. In a second study, transaction data from an online ticket exchange
shows that, after receiving targeted offers, customers are less likely to broaden their
purchasing to new genres. These findings indicate that targeted offers carry a hidden
cost: a decrease in customer exploration and discovery.
Thesis Supervisor: Duncan I. Simester
Title: NTU Professor of Management Science
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Chapter 1
Private Label vs. National Brand
Price Sensitivity: Evaluating
Non-experimental Identification
Strategies
Abstract
Predictions vary on how the price sensitivity of private labels differs from that of other
products. Using a large-scale field experiment we first show that private label demand
is less price sensitive than national brand demand. We then compare the estimates
from the experimental study with estimates using the same retailer's transaction
history. This allows us to evaluate several methods for controlling for the endogeneity
of prices in non-experimental studies. Measuring price sensitivity in the historical data
without accounting for endogeneity performs poorly. Instrumental variables estimates
with commodity prices as instruments and regression discontinuity estimates also
differ from the experimental benchmark. However, estimates using wholesale prices
as an instrument closely replicate the experimental estimates. These findings indicate
that the wholesale price is an effective instrument for retail price.
1.1 Introduction
Private label products feature prominently in contemporary retailing. Shares of total
sales have grown substantially both in the U.S. and internationally over recent years,
and private labels are perceived as a strong opportunity for retailer growth. 1 Under-
standing the price sensitivity of demand for private labels is critical for determining
pricing strategy and managing a private label portfolio. However, it is uncertain,
a priori, whether we expect to find that private labels are more or less price sensi-
tive than national brands. Using a large-scale field experiment, we find that price
sensitivity for private labels is lower than that of national brands. The experimen-
tal results serve as a benchmark to evaluate non-experimental (or 'observational')
estimates based on the same retailer's transaction history. We find that estimates
vary substantially depending on the approach to estimation. Instrumental variables
estimation using wholesale prices was most effective in replicating the experiment.
The field experiment was conducted through a retail chain. Regular prices were
exogenously manipulated for a sample of 192 items across 18 retail locations, and
maintained for a 17 week period. The experiment provides strong internal validity.
However, field experiments are expensive to run, and are often unavailable to re-
searchers and managers. The availability of the firm's historical data allows us to
generalize the finding to a broader sample of products, and in the process evalu-
ate non-experimental techniques based on assumptions that are otherwise difficult to
validate.
Using the historical data, we estimate price elasticities using instrumental vari-
ables (IV) to account for endogeneity of prices. This approach requires an instrument
that satisfies two conditions: it must be correlated with prices, and uncorrelated
with the statistical error (the exclusion restriction). The proposed instruments in-
clude wholesale prices and commodity price indexes. A qualitative assessment sug-
gests that while wholesale prices are more strongly correlated with retail prices, the
commodity prices are more likely to satisfy the exclusion restriction. Using either
instrument, IV confirms the finding that private label demand is less price sensitive
than national brands, whereas ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates would not have
found a significant difference. Standard diagnostics offer little guidance on which set
of instruments is better. However, the wholesale price turns out to be remarkably
effective at replicating the experimental estimates.
We also apply a regression discontinuity (RD) analysis to the historical data.
The retailer's prices are characterized by infrequent and discrete changes, so that
they resemble a step function over time. These changes are likely to be correlated
with unobserved demand shocks, but the unobserved factors may be relatively stable
around the time of the price changes. Under this assumption, a comparison of sales
immediately before and after price changes can be used to estimate price sensitivity.
The experimental benchmark reveals that RD is not a valid approach to measuring
price sensitivity in this setting. The estimates are larger in magnitude than the
'in 2010, private labels held a 17.4% share in the U.S., at least a 2% increase over 5 years,
according to Nielson (2011).
experimental estimates due to promotional activity coinciding with price changes.
Moreover, the difference between private label and national brand elasticity estimates
is attenuated due to the timing of price changes.
Field experiments have previously been used as a means of validating non- ex-
perimental methods, primarily in the context of employment and education program
evaluation. The methods have included sample selection, matching, and regression
discontinuity. To our knowledge, this study offers the first experimental validation of
a conventional instrumental variables estimator, and the first such validation of es-
timation strategies for price sensitivity. The importance of these results is amplified
by the widespread use of instrumental variables techniques and the recognition that
price is a potentially endogenous variable.
Section 2 reviews the related literature, including alternative predictions for why
we might expect differences in private label and national brand price sensitivities.
Section 3 presents the results from the field experiment. Section 4 presents the
instrumental variable estimates and Section 5 presents the regression discontinuity
estimates. Section 6 concludes.
1.2 Predictions
The relationship between private labels and national brands is complex, and figures
as a familiar topic in the marketing literature (Sethuraman, 2009, offers a recent
review). Intuitively appealing theories can yield different predictions about how price
sensitivity differs between these classes of products. While not an exhaustive catalog,
this section describes several hypotheses supported by the marketing literature.
1.2.1 Higher price sensitivity for private labels
Customer differences may affect price sensitivity for private labels relative to national
brands. Hansen, Singh, and Chintagunta (2006) report that household tendency to
buy store brands is correlated across categories, and is also positively correlated with
price sensitivity. Looking at variation across locations, Hoch (1996) reports that
private labels are more prevalent (i.e. have higher shares) in stores with more price-
sensitive consumers, as measured by store-level price elasticity, and demographics
associated with price sensitivity (e.g. age and income; see Hoch, Kim, Montgomery,
and Rossi, 1995 for details). If the customers that tend to buy private labels are more
price sensitive, then we might expect private label demand to be more price sensitive
than national brand demand.
Another reason why private label demand might be more price sensitive is because
private label products lack strong differentiation compared to national brands. Scott
Morton and Zettelmeyer (2004) argue that retailers position their private labels to
imitate leading national brands for strategic reasons: they can improve their nego-
tiating power (also see Narasimhan and Wilcox, 1998), and free-ride on marketing
activities. Empirically, they find that private labels often match national brands in
appearance, and are placed next to national brands on store shelves. If this signals
that the private label is equivalent to the national brand, it should result in higher
price sensitivity. While this strategy should also increase the price sensitivity of tar-
geted national brands, the effects are unlikely to be symmetric because we expect
national brands to retain some loyal customers.
While a retailer may attempt to imitate the positioning of the national brand,
customers do not necessarily treat the private label and national brand as undiffer-
entiated. This implies a difference in brand credibility. Erdem, Swait, and Louviere
(2002) show that high brand credibility lowers price sensitivity, in part because it
lowers consumers' perceived risk. Thus, we might expect brand credibility to matter
less in low risk categories, and to matter more in risky product categories. Studies
have found that perceived risk in a product category affects private label success
(Bettman, 1974; Narasimhan and Wilcox, 1998). Together, these findings suggest
that private labels have less brand credibility and higher price sensitivity.
Differences in market share and scaling effects may contribute to differences in
price sensitivity. All else equal, a smaller market share will increase measures of price
sensitivity scaled to a product's own sales volume. This includes the most commonly
used measure, price elasticity, because it affects the denominator of the elasticity. If
private label shares tend to be smaller than those of leading national brands, all else
equal we might find higher price elasticities. Similar reasoning has been offered as an
explanation for asymmetries in cross-price elasticities (Sethuraman, Srinivasan, and
Kim, 1999).
1.2.2 Lower price sensitivity for private labels
We also offer several reasons why private labels could be less price sensitive than
national brands. One possibility is that retailers are more likely to launch private
labels in categories where they expect inelastic demand. Raju, Sethuraman, and
Dhar (1995) find that store brand entry and store brand shares are correlated with low
national brand price sensitivity, because the retailer can already earn higher profits
when manufacturers are in price competition with each other. This is consistent
with Scott Morton and Zettelmeyer's (2004) finding that retailers are more likely to
introduce store brands against powerful national brands. As a result, private labels
could be more common in categories with low price sensitivity.
Contrary to the prediction that private label products lack differentiation, they
may derive differentiation from the retailers that market them. Between retailers,
there may be more intra-brand competition for national brands than for private la-
bels, which are harder to directly compare (Steiner, 2004). A given retailer may
choose not to carry competing products at a similar price point. If the private label
has the lowest price in a category, a price-sensitive customer's next-best alternative
may be to exit the category. Previous research suggests that category choice is less
sensitive to marketing actions than brand choice (typically found in the decomposition
of promotional elasticities, e.g. Gupta, 1988, and Bell, Chiang, and Padmanabhan,
1999), and a similar effect could extend to regular prices. This outcome could also
result from non-compensatory preferences where a segment screens on price: a prefer-
ence for the cheapest option would result in lower price sensitivity for private labels.
Thus, a lack of in-store substitutes could result in lower price sensitivity for private
labels.
The information available to customers may also affect price sensitivity. If cus-
tomers have poor price knowledge for private labels relative to national brands, they
may not recognize price changes. As a result, they may be less sensitive to posted
prices. Price knowledge can vary for a variety of reasons (for examples, see Vanhuele
and Dreze, 2002). Price knowledge may be lower for private labels because they are
harder to compare across retailers, and customers may have less exposure to private
label products. Hoch and Lodish (1998) report survey results showing worse price
recall for private labels.
When they are unable or unmotivated to compare prices, customers tend to rely
on price cues (Inman, McAlister, and Hoyer, 1990). Anderson, Cho, Harlam, and
Simester (2010) find that customer price knowledge has a positive relationship with
price sensitivity, and a negative relationship with price cue sensitivity. Thus, lower
price knowledge for private labels could result in lower price sensitivity. Furthermore,
if customers perceive private labels as a signal of low prices, they may be less attentive
to private label prices, reinforcing the lower price knowledge for private labels.
Table 1.1: Summary of Predictions
Higher price sensitivity for private labels
Price sensitive customers select into private labels
Private labels are undifferentiated
Private labels lack brand credibility, perceived as high risk
Scaling effects for certain measures of price sensitivity
Lower price sensitivity for private labels
Selective entry by retailers
Lack of substitutes at lowest price point
Lower price knowledge for private labels
1.2.3 Previous findings
In related research, Hoch and Lodish (1998) studied the effect of the price gap between
private labels and national brands using a field experiment. They vary the price gap
by changing all the private label prices in the analgesics category. Private label sales
are relatively insensitive to the size of the gap. However, this measures sensitivity
to the category pricing policy, and does not measure the effect of national brand
prices. Category elasticities are typically lower than item-level elasticities, which
could account for the price insensitivity. Also, customers may react differently if
the change in the price gap is due to a change in national brand prices. In the
experiment reported in this paper, prices vary on individual items for both private
labels and national brands.
Non-experimental findings on the price sensitivity of private labels are inconclu-
sive. In a cross-category study, Narasimhan, Neslin, and Sen (1996) find that private
label share is unrelated to promotional elasticities across 108 categories. Sivakumar
and Raj (1997) decompose price effects on brand choice and category choice. They
find that private labels are less sensitive to price decreases, and they find mixed re-
sults for price increases. This analysis is limited to four categories, and the source
of the variation in prices is mainly due to price promotions. In this paper we exam-
ine the effects of regular prices. Cotterill, Putsis, and Dhar (2000) examine regular
price effects, pooling across a broad sample of products, and estimate a private label
elasticity that was only slightly lower than national brand elasticity. However, the
data is aggregated to the category level, and is based on differences across categories
and markets. We expect to find sharper differences, based on variation over time for
individual products.
In a meta-analysis of 1,851 price elasticity estimates (147 of which are for pri-
vate labels) from 81 publications, Bijmolt, Van Heerde, and Pieters (2005) report no
significant effect of brand ownership on price elasticity (with average elasticities of
-2.67 for manufacturer brands and -2.59 for private labels). While the meta-analysis
combines estimates from diverse studies, it attempts to control for differences in re-
tail setting and methodology. The endogeneity of marketing decision variables may
contribute to this null result: only 293 of the 1,851 estimates accounted for endogene-
ity of prices. Table 1.2 reviews a sample of elasticity estimates from the literature
that were not included in the meta-analysis. Though this table is limited to a few
categories, we observe a tendency for the private label elasticity estimates to be lower
than those of national brands. These more recent studies are also more likely to
account for endogeneity.
Supply and demand are a classic example of simultaneity, meaning that retailer
and customer decisions affect each other. When estimating the price elasticity of
demand, it is important to take this simultaneity into account. If retailers use in-
formation about demand to set prices, but we do not incorporate this information
into our model, we may attribute changes in demand to changes in price when they
have actually been caused by other factors. As an example, in the spring of 2010,
the municipal water supplies for many cities in metro Boston were briefly declared
unsafe for drinking following a water main break. As a result, the quantity demanded
for bottled water increased in many communities. A few retailers responded to this
upwards shift in demand by increasing prices; however, it would be mistaken to at-
tribute the increase in demand to the increase in price (Ailworth, 2010). Any source
of correlation between prices and the statistical error term can produce inconsistent
estimates, including simultaneity, omitted variables, and measurement error.
The goal of this paper is to provide a robust comparison of consumer price sensi-
tivity for private label and national brand products based on causal inferences about
price effects. One way to address the endogeneity of prices is through the use of an
experiment, but the scope of such an experiment is necessarily limited. To general-
ize the findings to a broader sample, and show how endogeneity might contribute to
the mixed findings in the literature, it is useful to reconcile the experimental find-
ings with estimates based on the historical transaction data. Thus, we report both
Table 1.2: Published Estimates of Private Label and National Brand Elasticities
Authors Journal Year Model Instruments Category PL NB Avg. NB # Avg. Diff.
JMR 2007 Choice
JMR 2002 Choice
Chintagunta, Bonfrer, and Song
Cotterill, Putsis, and Dhar
Kamakura and Kang
Pofhal and Richards
Song and Chintagunta
Wholesale
Prices
MS 2002 Choice Commodity
Prices
JB 2000 LA/AIDS Item Size,
Industry
Concentration
JR 2007 Log-Log
Analgesics
Oats
Frozen Pasta
Pool 125 Categories
Milk
Butter
Bread
Pasta
Margarine
Instant Coffee
Toothpaste
Toothbrushes
AJAE 2009 LA/AIDS Wholesale Apple Juice
Prices Cranberry Blends
Grapefruit Juice
MS 2006 Choice
Log-Log
Wholesale Liquid Detergent
Prices Liquid Softener
Softener Sheets
Liquid Detergent
Liquid Softener
Softener Sheets
-3.18 -4.54
-1.81 -2.65
-2.24 -2.79
-3.85 -4.53
-0.98
-0.92
-2.49
-0.80
-3.66
-6.38
-0.37
-1.07
-2.05
-1.50
-1.31
-1.46
-1.39
-1.03
-2.20 -2.10
-0.29 -1.81
-3.80
-8.00
-3.88
-3.51
-1.56
-2.19
-1.18
-1.50
-4.39
-8.39
-3.61
-5.01
-3.94
-1.94
-2.88
-4.70
-2.51
-2.40
Note: Table includes elasticity estimates that were
are simple averages by category.
not included in the Bijmolt, Van Heerde, and Pieters (2005) meta-analysis. Reported values
Key: AJAE - American Journal of Agricultural Economics, JB - Journal of Business, JBES - Journal of Business and Economic Statistics,
JMR - Journal of Marketing Research, JR - Journal of Retailing, MS - Management Science.
Chen and Yang
Chintagunta
1.36
0.84
0.55
0.67
0.09
1.13
-0.99
0.52
-2.20
-4.99
0.66
-0.11
1.52
4.59
-4.39
1.13
0.43
0.38
0.69
3.52
1.02
-1.99
experimental and non-experimental approaches to this problem.
The use of an experimental benchmark as a means of evaluating non-experimental
estimates has a rich history in program evaluation. A landmark example is LaLonde
(1986), who compares experimental and non-experimental estimates of job training
outcomes to demonstrate the difficulty in recovering the experimental estimates using
non-experimental methods. This initiated a stream of research that has continued to
improve non-experimental program evaluation (e.g. Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd,
1997; Dehejia and Wahba 1999). In an example from education research, Aiken, West,
Schwalm, Carroll, and Hsiung (1998) obtained similar results evaluating a program
using a randomized experiment and a regression discontinuity design. In the regres-
sion discontinuity version of the study, assignment to a program was based on cutoff
values of standardized test scores. However, validation in the context of education
does not imply that regression discontinuity will work in marketing applications.
In general, there is a shortage of research using field experiments to validate
conventional instrumental variables estimators.2 The closest previous research uses
experiments to validate structural models. Todd and Wolpin (2006) use a school
subsidy experiment to validate the predictions of a structural model of schooling and
fertility decisions. While the estimation of the model requires the specification of
exclusion restrictions, the experiment is used to evaluate the overall predictive ability
of the economic model, and not the exclusion restriction in isolation. In comparison,
we focus on validating the proposed instruments using less restrictive specifications.
1.3 Field Experiment
This section presents estimates of private label and national brand price elasticities
based on the results of a large scale field experiment. Experiments are an ideal way
to measure the effect of endogenous variables, as changing one variable at a time
controls for omitted variables and other sources of bias. Compared to a laboratory
experiment, field experiments have the advantage of taking place in a natural setting,
and the participants are not aware that an experiment is taking place. The customers
of the stores hosting the experiment make real decisions as they normally would,
ensuring incentive compatibility.
Field experiments have become increasingly common in economics and marketing
research, and have been used to study price sensitivity on several occasions. An early
example is Curhan (1974), in which prices and other marketing variables were varied
for supermarket produce. Hoch and Lodish (1998) and Hoch, Dreze, and Purk (1994)
both varied supermarket category-level prices, to compare broad pricing strategies.
2 By 'conventional,' we refer broadly to instrumental variables estimators other than randomized
experiments and regression discontinuity designs, either of which can be framed as a special case of
instrumental variables.
1.3.1 Experimental Design
The experiment was conducted with the cooperation of a large retail chain. The
stores sell a typical array of products in the grocery, health and beauty and general
merchandise categories. The stores are smaller than most supermarkets and are lo-
cated in convenient residential and urban locations. The experiment took place at
18 stores located in a single metropolitan area. The test items were sampled in a
hierarchical manner: a single item was initially selected at random to represent each
category, and then the final selections were reviewed to avoid including close substi-
tutes or complements. Of the 192 items included, 47 were private labels. The items
and stores were randomized into blocks, and the experimental conditions were rotated
through these blocks to ensure a balanced design. A description of the experiment
and its results were also reported in Anderson, Cho, Harlam, and Simester (2010).
The experiment included two pricing conditions: a control condition, in which the
regular prices were maintained, and a discount condition, in which the regular prices
were reduced by 12%.3 There was no unusual signage or other indication that the
price had been changed in the discount condition. Temporary promotions continued
to affect prices in both conditions. This arrangement was maintained for a 17 week
period. The outcome of the experiment was recorded as the units sold and average
prices paid for each item, at each store, for each week of the experiment, resulting in
a sample of 39,168 observations.
The 12% reduction in prices resulted in a 13% average increase in quantities. There
was a 15% increase for national brands, and an 8% increase for private labels, averaged
at the item level. The corresponding average elasticities are -1.26 for national brands
and -0.68 for private labels. Pooling over all items, the difference in units sold
(between conditions) is significantly smaller for private labels than for national brands,
suggesting that the private labels are less sensitive to the discount (see univariate
results in Table 1.3).
1.3.2 Poisson Regression
Typically, the weekly quantity for a given item in a store is fewer than ten units. The
number of units sold is a highly skewed, nonnegative 'count' measure, and there are
many instances of zero units sold in a period (occurring for 20% of item-store-week
combinations). We incorporate these natural restrictions in a multivariate analysis
using Poisson regression.4 We will use the resulting estimates, an average elasticity
3 There was an additional experimental condition that varied the presence of price cues. This is
used by Anderson, Cho, Harlam, and Simester (2010) to compare the effect of price knowledge on
responses to price changes and price cues.
4Parameter estimates for Poisson regression are known to be consistent when the conditional
mean of Qi.t is correctly specified; however, the maximum likelihood standard errors depend on the
restrictive Poisson distribution assumption. We report quasi-maximum likelihood (QML) standard
errors, which relax the Poisson assumption by leaving the variance of Qist unspecified (Wooldridge,
1999). Standard errors were clustered on item, which allows for serial correlation over time and
across stores.
Table 1.3: Field Experiment Average Weekly Units by Condition
Condition
Discount Control Difference N
National 10.58** 8.84** 1.74** 2465
Brand (0.79) (0.58) (0.27)
Private 5.41** 5.22** 0.19t
Label (0.42) (0.43) (0.10)
1.55**Difference (.48)(0.48)
t Significantly different from zero, p
* Significantly different from zero, p
** Significantly different from zero, p
Standard errors in parentheses.
< 0.10
< 0.05
< 0.01
that accounts for item and store differences, as
experimental results.
a benchmark to evaluate the non-
The Poisson regression assumes that the number of units sold, Qit (for item i, in
store s, in week t), follows a Poisson distribution with rate parameter Ait:
Pr [Qi,,t = q] = , q = 0, 1, 2,...q! (1.1)
The Poisson parameter, which is the mean (as well as the variance) of the distribution,
is modeled as a multiplicative function of the covariates, and includes item (pt) and
store (7,) fixed effects:
In Aist = #NB (discounts., x national brandi)
+ #PL (discounti, x private labeli) + pi + 7,
(1.2)
(1.3)
The effect of the discount was estimated to increase sales by 16% for national brands,
but only 3% for private labels (see multivariate results in Table 1.4). The difference
between these estimates is statistically significant. Adjusting for the change in average
prices in each condition, the point estimates of the price elasticities were -1.22 for
national brands and -0.25 for private labels.5
5As a robustness check, we estimated instrumental variables models that explicitly control for
compliance in pricing conditions, which resulted in slightly larger magnitudes but did not have
a substantive impact. Also, while the dollar value discount was larger on average for national
brands, we obtained similar results using price levels as the independent variable. We performed
a falsification test by applying the model to an earlier 17-week period, and the difference between
conditions was not significant. Several alternative specifications, including a negative binomial model
and zero-inflated Poisson model, did not result in qualitative differences.
Table 1.4: Poisson Quasi-Maximum Likelihood Estimates
Discount Effect Elasticity
National 0.156** -1.22**
Brand (0.048) (0.38)
Private 0.031 -0.25
Label (0.032) (0.25)
Difference p < 0.05
* Significantly different from zero, p < 0.05
** Significantly different from zero, p < 0.01
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on item.
Elasticities are the QML estimates scaled to adjust
for change in prices due to the experiment.
1.3.3 Discussion
The field test reveals a substantial difference in price sensitivity, and the estimates
for private label demand are surprisingly inelastic. A price elasticity between -1 and
0 implies that by raising its prices, the retailer could generate higher revenues while
selling fewer units, lowering total costs and increasing profit. A reason for not doing
so may be to maintain the retailer's price image, due to concerns about store traffic.
Furthermore, these estimates measure price sensitivity at price levels in the neighbor-
hood of the observed regular prices, and may not predict how price sensitivity would
change if prices were increased by large amounts, or if many prices were increased at
the same time. Private label price sensitivity may increase dramatically as the price
gap with national brand prices narrows, but the retailer has explicitly stated that
they take care to maintain the gap.
The difference in price sensitivities favors predictions that price sensitivity should
be lower for private labels than for national brands. These include selective entry
by the retailer, a lack of substitutes for the cheapest product, and lower customer
price knowledge for private labels. A limitation of this experiment is that it does not
permit us to distinguish between these explanations. Furthermore, these factors, as
well as the offsetting factors that predict higher price sensitivity for private labels, are
not mutually exclusive; each may play a role to varying degrees for different products.
An investigation into the relative importance of these factors is beyond the scope of
the paper, but is the subject of ongoing research.
A separate question raised by this finding is why the estimates differ from previous
research. The point estimates of -1.22 and -0.25 are relatively low in magnitude,
though they fall within the ranges reported in the literature. In Bijmolt, Van Heerde,
and Pieters (2005), 15% of reported elasticity estimates fall between 0 and -1, and
25% fall between -1 and -2; the average elasticity was -2.62. A likely explanation
for why the estimates in this study are lower than average is that we measure the
effect of changes in regular price. Previous studies have found that regular price
elasticities are relatively low, whereas promotional elasticities are higher in the short
run, and lower in the long run (Jedidi, Mela, and Gupta, 1999; Pauwels, Hanssens,
and Siddarth, 2002). Time-shifting and stockpiling effects generate strong responses
during promotions, and sales may drop below normal after promotions end (Hendel
and Nevo, 2006). Other marketing actions, such as in-store displays, sale signs, and
advertising, may be correlated with these temporary discounts; when these factors
are difficult to disentangle, promotional price elasticity estimates may increase fur-
ther. We will reexamine this proposed explanation when we discuss the results of the
instrumental variables estimation.
Another feature of the experimental results is that the difference between private
label and national brand price sensitivity is more pronounced than in previous re-
search. Studies using broad samples of products, including the Bijmolt et al. (2005)
meta-analysis, have not found significant differences. The endogeneity of prices could
account for this null result, particularly if retailer pricing policy differs for private la-
bels and national brands. For example, consider a case where the private label price
is set to maintain a certain gap with the national brand price. A positive demand
shock specific to the national brand could induce a price increase in both products,
while also causing the private label to lose share to the national brand. This would
overstate the price sensitivity of the private label. This endogeneity problem poten-
tially affects many empirical estimates in the literature. The field experiment removes
concerns about endogeneity of prices because prices are exogenously manipulated.
A drawback of the field experiment is the comparatively narrow sample, in the
sense that 192 items is a small fraction of the thousands of items that this retailer
sells. Yet running an experiment on this scale is already a considerable undertaking.
Many retailers may be reluctant to run similar studies, due to the direct costs of
implementation and the loss of profits from suboptimal pricing. Also, increasing the
breadth of such an experiment could cause interference between the items included
in the sample. Historical data generally has the advantage of sampling broadly from
items across many stores, and is readily available to researchers and firms. However,
there is a pressing need for reliable validation of non-experimental methods for esti-
mating price effects in such data. By using the experimental result as a benchmark,
we can evaluate the different identification strategies. Furthermore, extending the
analysis to the historical data can help show how correcting for endogeneity accounts
for the departure from previous findings.
1.4 Instrumental Variables
The remainder of this paper presents empirical estimates of private label and national
brand price elasticities using the firm's transaction history. In this section, we use
instrumental variables (IV) estimation to correct for endogeneity of prices. First,
we introduce the historical data and report linear regression estimates that do not
correct for endogeneity. Then we will consider using wholesale prices and commodity
prices as instruments, and discuss the merits and limitations of each. We conclude
this section with comments on the results of the IV estimation.
1.4.1 Data
The transaction data was obtained at the SKU level. Sales are aggregated over
81 stores from the same retail chain as in the field experiment, with 348 weekly
observations from 2003-2009. The information available includes regular prices, paid
prices, costs (wholesale prices), and quantities sold for each week. We performed
analysis on the balanced panel of 1,969 items which were available throughout the
time horizon, for a total of 685,212 observations. This set included 493 private label
items (25%).
Item-level data identifies competitive items for some private label items, and for
national brands targeted by private label brands. A retailer-defined SKU hierarchy
was also available, with information on product categories.
1.4.2 Model
We estimate price sensitivity by regressing log quantities Q on prices P, using the
equation below. The price coefficients can be interpreted as elasticities. The subscript
i indexes items, and t indexes weeks. We use a linear regression, which will permit
a straightforward specification for instrumental variables estimation (with aggregate
data, the larger quantities and lack of observations with zero demand weaken the
motivation for the Poisson regression). The model includes item (Pi) and week (6 t)
fixed effects. The item effects control for differences in scale between items with high
and low sales volume, and for any item-specific factors that do not vary over time.
The week fixed effects control for factors that only vary over time, and account for
trends in aggregate demand. Variations in the specification for time (such as using a
time trend instead of dummies, or estimating a separate trend for private labels) do
not qualitatively change the estimates. 6
In Qit = #NB (nPit x national brand,) + #PL (ln Pit x private labeli) + Lt + ot + Eit
(1.4)
The estimates pool across items, to compare average price sensitivity for all 1,969
products. Interactions between price and dummy variables (for private labels and
national brands) are used to separately estimate the price sensitivity of private labels
and national brands. This results in measures of average price elasticity that are
directly comparable to the results of the field experiment. Pooling is also helpful
because price changes for individual items occur relatively infrequently. For a given
item, the regular price will tend to change once a year or less. Thus, despite the
long time frame, we observe very little variation in prices, which makes it difficult to
estimate price sensitivity for individual products.
6The reported standard errors are clustered on item and week. Clustering on item provides results
that are robust to arbitrary correlation in the error term for different time periods, while clustering on
week provides results that are robust to correlation in errors for different products. This adjustment
is used because a product's weekly sales could be serially correlated, and contemporaneous errors
could be correlated for related products.
Table 1.5: OLS Estimates of Price Elasticity
Experimental
Benchmark OLS
National -1.22** -1.08**
Brand (0.38) (0.16)
Private -0.25 -0.88**
Label (0.25) (0.11)
Difference p < 0.05 n.s.
* Significantly different from zero, p < 0.05
** Significantly different from zero, p < 0.01
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on item and week.
1.4.3 OLS Estimates
The equation above was first estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS). The point
estimates of the regular price elasticities were -1.08 for national brands, and -0.88
for private labels (see Table 1.5). The estimates are significantly different from zero,
but the difference between these coefficients is not significant. This pattern does not
replicate the results of the field experiment. A possible reason for this inconsistency
is that the OLS estimates are vulnerable to bias as a result of price endogeneity. As
previously noted, endogeneity could account for the mixed results in previous studies,
and our OLS estimates are similarly ambiguous. To reconcile the historical data with
the field experiment, we next turn to instrumental variables estimation.
1.4.4 Wholesale Price as an Instrument
Instrumental variables estimation is a powerful tool for causal inference. This method
uses a variable known as an instrument, which affects the dependent variable (quan-
tity) only through the endogenous regressor (price). A valid instrument should be
correlated with the endogenous regressor, and uncorrelated with the statistical error
term (commonly referred to as the exclusion restriction). If the assumptions hold, IV
allows us to use variation in prices correlated with cost changes to identify the effect of
prices on demand, while ignoring variation in prices correlated with omitted factors.
IV is frequently used in research requiring consistent estimates of price parameters.
The wholesale price provided by the retailer is an attractive potential instrument.
The retailer prioritizes the proper computation and maintenance of this variable,
updating it to reflect the firm's current replacement costs as provided by their supplier
contracts. Thus, it is a good proxy for marginal cost, the economic construct that
helps determine optimal prices. In practical terms, the firm's managers rely on the
cost variable to compute margins for each item, and as the basis for making pricing
decisions. The variable does not include trade promotions or other short-term changes
in cost, so it should not cause short-term changes in price due to promotions. Thus, we
expect that changes in price due to changes in this measure of cost are comparable to
the unadvertised regular price change implemented in the field experiment. Inspection
of the price and cost time series for individual items shows that price changes are often
precipitated by cost changes, and the two variables are highly correlated. First-stage
statistics are reported in Table 1.6.
Table 1.6: First-Stage Estimates (Regression of Retail Prices on Costs)
Wholesale Proc. Food Pharma. Angrist-
Price PPI PPI Pischke F
National 0.77** 0.12** 0.57** 179.2
Brand (0.06) (0.02) (0.07) p < 0.01
Private 0.22** 0.18** 0.72** 37.2
Label (0.02) (0.03) (0.11) p < 0.01
* Significantly different from zero, p < 0.05
** Significantly different from zero, p < 0.01
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on item and week.
First-stage estimates based on model using full set of instruments.
Results are qualitatively similar for models using wholesale price
and commodity prices separately.
The second assumption, the exclusion restriction, is difficult to assess. One con-
cern is that wholesale prices may respond to a number of unobserved factors affecting
demand, such as manufacturer advertising expenditures. This could result in a si-
multaneity problem. Another concern is that wholesale prices affect demand through
mechanisms other than price. For example, if the retailer adjusts the prices of compet-
itive products in reaction to cost changes, it could affect demand through cross-price
effects. Wholesale price could also affect other, harder to observe actions, such as
shelf space allocation. Prior research on consumer goods has assumed that changes
in wholesale prices are mainly driven by manufacturing costs. Chintagunta (2002)
argues that manufacturers are required by law to set market-level wholesale prices,
and so cannot easily react to changes in demand specific to a retailer. However, given
the plausible explanations for how exclusion could fail, any argument in favor of using
wholesale prices rests on the expectation that the correlation with retail prices is very
high relative to potential violations of this assumption.
We present several approaches to evaluate the exclusion restriction. After intro-
ducing additional instruments later in this section, we report specification tests that
favor the validity of the wholesale price as an instrument (see Table 1.7). However, we
recognize that these tests are of limited diagnostic value. 7 An alternative approach
71t has been suggested that an over-identified model, with more instruments than endogenous
variables, permits a degree of specification testing of the exclusion restrictions (Wooldridge, 2002,
§6.2.2). Hansen's J statistic is a general specification test for GMM estimators, and we fail to reject
the null of no misspecification. We caution that this procedure cannot reliably refute or validate
is to perform a sensitivity analysis, in which we relax the exclusion restriction (e.g.
Angrist, Imbens, and Rubin, 1996). Our analysis shows that the estimates are robust
to small amounts of correlation between the wholesale price and the statistical error
(see Appendix). Finally, we will use the field experiment as a benchmark to evaluate
the IV estimates.
Table 1.7: Comparison of Instrumental Variables Estimates
Instruments Used
Experimental Wholesale Commodity All
Benchmark Price Prices Instruments
National -1.22** -1.19** -1.89** -1.40**
Brand (0.38) (0.21) (0.31) (0.17)
Private -0.25 -0.16 -0.20 -0.12
Label (0.25) (0.32) (0.46) (0.26)
Difference p < 0.05 p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01
Hansen's J 2.43 6.36
n.s. n.s.
* Significantly different from zero, p < 0.05
** Significantly different from zero, p < 0.01
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on item and week.
The model was re-estimated using wholesale price as an instrument for retail
price. The estimated price elasticities were -1.19 for national brands, and -0.16 for
private labels (see Table 1.7). The IV estimates are nearly identical to the estimates
from the field experiment, and private labels are significantly less price sensitive than
national brands. This strongly suggests that, despite concerns about the exclusion
restriction, the wholesale price instrument eliminates far more bias than it introduces,
and appears to be an effective way to estimate price sensitivity.
1.4.5 Commodity Prices as Instruments
Commodity prices that measure costs of manufacturing inputs have also been used
as instruments. Market-level indexes are unlikely to have a direct relationship with
demand in our data, and thus it is more likely to satisfy the exclusion restriction.
However, they are less correlated with retail prices. We evaluated several producer
price index (PPI) series as potential instruments. PPIs for processed foods and phar-
maceutical chemicals were used due to strong first-stage results and their relevance
to the products represented at the store. The instruments each generated positive
and significant first-stage coefficients, consistent with the intuition that higher costs
exclusion restrictions; the test's power is unpredictable, and different instruments may identify
different treatment effects.
result in higher retail prices, but the association is not as strong as it is for wholesale
price (see Table 1.6).
The model was re-estimated using two-step GMM, with the commodity prices as
instruments and also with a full set of instruments. With only the commodity prices
as instruments, the estimated price elasticities were -1.89 for national brands, and
-0.20 for private labels. The difference between these coefficients is statistically sig-
nificant, which replicates the corresponding result from field experiment. However,
the estimates are less precise and differ in magnitude from the experimental bench-
mark; the point estimate for national brand elasticity differs from the experimental
benchmark by two standard errors (see Table 1.7).
1.4.6 Discussion
While the OLS estimates were inconsistent with the field experiment, the IV estimates
appear to do well in reproducing the experimental results. Using the wholesale price
as an instrument yields very similar findings to the field experiment. Results using the
commodity prices are credible but less precise. Notice that without the benefit of the
experimental benchmark, there would have been little indication of which approach
is more accurate. In many applications, there is a tradeoff between the strength of
correlation with the endogenous regressor and confidence in the exclusion restriction.
These two factors affect the precision and bias of the IV estimator. In this case, the
strength of correlation favors the wholesale price instrument, while the confidence in
the exclusion restriction favors the commodity prices.
A comparison of the IV and OLS results indicates that the difference in magnitude
between our elasticity estimates and those typically reported in the literature can
at least partly be attributed to our focus on regular prices. The historical data
contains paid prices, which include temporary price promotions. For some items, the
paid prices can vary substantially from week to week, and are correlated with short-
term fluctuations in quantities, whereas for other items it deviates very little from
the regular price. Paid price elasticities estimated using OLS are much higher than
regular price elasticities (-2.10 for national brands and -1.64 for private labels), and
correspond more closely to the elasticities in other studies. However, when using the
wholesale price as an instrument, the regular and paid prices yield identical elasticity
estimates. The wholesale price does not appear to capture variation in prices due to
promotional activity, and so provides estimates comparable to the field experiment
results.
The IV estimates for the private label elasticity are lower in magnitude than the
OLS estimate, whereas we typically expect IV estimates to be larger. This is because
we expect firms to raise prices in response to demand increases, resulting in same-sign
shifts in prices and quantities. This has the effect of attenuating demand elasticity
estimates when not correcting for endogeneity. Our results, on the other hand, suggest
that the endogeneity bias has the opposite sign for private labels. This effect could
be a result of private label pricing policy. In some cases, the private label price may
be set to maintain a certain gap with the national brand price. Given such a policy, a
positive demand shock for the national brand could result in a price increase for both
products, while also causing the private label to lose share to the national brand. As a
result, OLS estimates would understate national brand price sensitivity, but overstate
private label price sensitivity. There is some evidence that this could be occurring.
An inspection of the price series for private label and national brand pairs shows that
the prices often move together. The average correlation coefficient between the price
series of these pairs is 0.60, while the average correlation between prices of products
within the same category (excluding paired products) is significantly lower, at 0.44.
These pricing patterns also help explain the weaker first-stage relationship for private
labels (see Table 1.6).
An alternative explanation for why the IV results differ for private labels and
national brands is that the cost variables measure different local average treatment
effects.' This could occur if the retailer's policy for passing on cost increases differs
for private labels and national brands. If the retailer passed on private label cost
increases only if customers are not price sensitive, while passing on cost increases for
national brands regardless of demand conditions, the IV estimates for private labels
and national brands may not be directly comparable. Such a policy could also help
explain the weaker first-stage for private labels. However, this explanation would not
affect the experimental estimates we use as a benchmark, and other likely explanations
for the differences in first-stage coefficients would not affect the IV estimates.9
One potential difference between the field experiment and the IV estimates is
that the experiment was designed to avoid competitive factors. In the historical data,
price changes for brands within a category could be correlated at both wholesale and
retail levels. Since the historical data offers a larger sample of items than the field
experiment, we were able to limit the analysis to paired data, consisting of national
brands and private labels in direct competition (as defined by the SKU hierarchy).
This procedure resulted in 398 private label and national brand pairs, which we used
to evaluate how much accounting for cross-price elasticities would affect the own-
price elasticity estimates. The own- and cross-price elasticities were estimated using
three-stage least squares (3SLS). The own-price elasticities were -1.47 for national
brands, and -0.46 for private labels; the estimates are significantly different from
8Under conditions established by Imbens and Angrist (1994), the IV estimator can be inter-
preted as a local average treatment effect (LATE). In particular, the instruments should satisfy a
'monotonicity' assumption; in this case, we expect higher costs to result in weakly higher prices. A
LATE measures the average demand elasticity, weighted towards units of observation whose prices
are more responsive to changes in cost (referred to as 'compliers'). For example, consider a retailer
selling two products. If the retailer passes through 100% of costs for the first product, and 0% for
the second product, IV would measure a LATE that captures the effect of price changes for only the
first product. In this manner, differences in the set of compliers could drive the difference between
private label and national brand IV estimates.
'In particular, a percentage change in wholesale price is smaller in absolute terms for a private
label product than for a national brand product. There are fixed costs associated with changing
prices, and they do not necessarily scale with price levels. These include direct menu costs (Levy,
Bergen, Dutta, and Venable, 1997, and Anderson, Jaimovich, and Simester, 2011) and the risk of
antagonizing customers (Anderson and Simester, 2010). A larger percentage change in wholesale
price may be necessary before it is worth incurring these costs for private labels as compared to
national brands. As a result, private label retail prices would be less responsive to wholesale prices,
accounting for the differences in first-stage coefficients.
each other, but only the former was significantly different from zero. Of the two
cross-price elasticities, only the effect of national brand prices on private labels was
significantly different from zero, at 0.58. It was not significantly different from the
effect of private label prices on national brands, at 0.29. Although we have not
specified a full system of cross-elasticities (for which it can be difficult to generate
reliable esitmates), these paired estimates suggest that the agreement between the
experimental and IV estimates would not be disrupted by accounting for competitive
effects.
Another approach to comparing estimates using the historical data to the field
experiment would be to treat price changes occurring in the historical data as quasi-
experiments. The impact of the price changes could be evaluated for short time
frames, to avoid the effects of changing demand over time and competitive effects.
Using this rationale, we next turn to a regression discontinuity design.
1.5 Regression Discontinuity
In this section, we describe a procedure for estimating price elasticities using a regres-
sion discontinuity design. We discuss identifying assumptions, and then use structural
break methods to locate price change events that might satisfy these assumptions. We
then report the regression discontinuity estimates, and compare them to the previous
results.
Regression discontinuity (RD) identifies a treatment effect based on a discontinu-
ity in the probability of treatment as a function of a running variable (also referred to
as the forcing variable or scoring variable). The estimates are produced by comparing
treatment and response on either side of the discontinuity. For example, Hartmann,
Nair, and Narayanan (2010) estimate the effect of targeted marketing based on the ob-
servation that firms apply marketing communication policies to discrete groups of cus-
tomers. The underlying customer types, which are firms' estimates of customer value,
are continuous variables. As a result, customers near the threshold between groups
are effectively randomly assigned to different marketing policies. Busse, Simester,
and Zettelmeyer (2009) estimate the effect of employee discount pricing promotions
on prices paid for automobiles. If the start date of the promotion is not confounded
by sudden changes in demand conditions, transactions occurring near the start of
the promotion are essentially randomly assigned to occur either before or during the
promotion.
In this study, the treatment is price, and the running variable is time. The re-
tailer's prices are characterized by discrete changes, usually occurring once a year or
less, so that they resemble a step function over time. Even if these price changes
are correlated with unobserved demand factors, they are infrequent enough that we
might expect the unobserved factors to be essentially constant during a short period
near the price changes.
'
0 These estimates are consistent with the asymmetry previously observed for promotional prices
(e.g. Blattberg and Wisniewski, 1989), but do not provide strong evidence that this effect extends
to regular prices.
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Figure 1-1: Breakpoints for NECCO Wafers
A valid RD design also requires that customers are unaware of price changes when
making store visit decisions, or are uncertain about timing of price changes. Knowl-
edge about the timing could cause some customers, who would have purchased before
a price drop, to wait for the price to change before visiting the store (Hartmann, Nair,
and Narayanan, 2010). In this study, these conditions seem likely to hold. Regular
price changes tend to be increases, which the retailer is unlikely to publicize through
circulars or advertisements. Also, the retail format is one where many customers
visit out of convenience or as a result of an acute need. These circumstances favor
the assumption that the customers are not making sophisticated, well-informed store
visit decisions that would invalidate the RD design.
1.5.1 Identifying Price Changes
The dataset does not include explicit price change dates, so these were inferred
through analysis of the prices themselves. Price change events were identified by
applying structural break detection methods to a linear regression of regular prices
on dummy variables for each price regime. Bai and Perron (1998, 2003) provide a
framework for testing for multiple structural breaks in linear models, and a dynamic
programming algorithm to quickly estimate the set of dates that minimize the sum of
square residuals (the alternative being a time-consuming grid search on all possible
combinations of breakpoints)."' The number of breakpoints for each price series is
chosen to minimize BIC, a criterion which penalizes over-fitting.
Uncertainty in the estimated locations of the breakpoints indicates price change
events that may be unsuitable for RD estimation. This is because we want to compare
prices and quantities precisely at the point where the price change occurs. Thus,
breakpoints with 95% confidence intervals any wider than the minimum interval (two
weeks, or one week in each direction) were discarded (see Figure 1-1 for an example;
"We implemented this analysis using the 'strucchange' R package (Zeileis, Kleiber, Krimer, and
Hornik, 2003).
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Figure 1-2: Averages Across Events by Time Since Event
the price change events on either side of week 150 were discarded)." Also, to avoid
confounding competitive effects, price changes that occurred within eight weeks of a
breakpoint identified for a competitive product were also discarded. This requirement
is consistent with the design of the field experiment, and had little effect on the results.
The final sample includes 3,410 price change events, occurring for 1,583 unique
items. Of these, 385 were private labels, a proportion consistent with the original
dataset, though private labels changed prices slightly less often than national brands.
Most of the events (85%) were price increases. The majority of items had relatively
few price change events: 86% had three or fewer over nearly seven years. The greatest
number of events identified for a given item was eight, occurring for just two items.
1.5.2 Model
The data used for each event includes the 6 weeks of sales before and after the price
change. The average prices and quantities are plotted against the running variable
(the time since the price change, with time reversed for price decreases) in Figure 1-2.
It is clear that average prices increase dramatically at the breakpoint, and quantities
decrease. It also appears that there is movement in the average prices and quantities
in the period preceding the estimated breakpoint, and that the levels have not fully
adjusted in the period of the price change. This is most likely because the exact
timing of the price changes do not coincide exactly with the discrete periods recorded
in the data.
The imperfect timing of the price changes results in what is known as a "fuzzy
RD" design, in contrast to a "sharp RD" design in which the treatment changes with
certainty (see Imbens and Lemieux, 2008). To correct for this, we used dummy vari-
12As an aside, NECCO wafers are candies produced by the New England Confectionary Com-
pany. From 1927 until 2003, NECCO wafers were manufactured in a factory located on Mas-
sachusetts Avenue in Cambridge, MA, not far from the MIT campus. Between 1996 and 2004, the
water tower on top of that building was painted to look like a roll of NECCO Wafers. Source:
http://necco.com/AboutUs/History.asp (retrieved 7/28/2011).
ables for the price change events as instruments for prices in estimating the equation
below. Fixed effects are included for each price change event, indexed by the subscript
j, and for each week t.
In Qjt = 3 NB (In Pjt x national brand) + #PL (ln Pt x private labe1) + uj + t + ejt
(1.5)
1.5.3 Results
The results are reported in Table 1.8. Using a 6-week window and the basic spec-
ification, the estimated price elasticities were -1.80 for national brands, and -1.46
for private labels. As with the instrumental variables estimates, private label de-
mand is significantly less price sensitive than national brand demand. However, the
magnitudes of the elasticity estimates are higher under the regression discontinuity
approach."
Table 1.8: RD Estimates, 6-Week Time Window
Price Changes Included
Experimental All Cost Change,
Benchmark Events No Promotions
National -1.22** -1.80** -0.88**
Brand (0.38) (0.07) (0.12)
Private -0.25 -1.46** -0.29
Label (0.25) (0.09) (0.29)
Difference p < 0.05 p < 0.01 p < 0.10
N 39,168 40,920 7,464
* Significantly different from zero, p < 0.05
** Significantly different from zero, p < 0.01
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on event.
The "Cost Change, No Promotions" subset is defined in Table 1.9.
There appear to be two reasons why the RD results differ. First, the short time
window is sensitive to the presence of promotions. In particular, for a subset of
private label products, the retailer increases promotions in advance of price increases,
13As an alternative specification, linear trends were fit for the period before and after the price
changes. This is equivalent to fitting a local linear regression for price and quantity near the dis-
continuity point, and estimating price elasticity based on predicted prices and quantities on either
side of the discontinuity point. However, the slight uncertainty in the timing of the price change
favors estimation using only the means. To minimize the potential impact of inconsistent timing, the
analysis was also run with the week on either side of the price change removed. Finally, the model
was fit with time windows of varying widths. The alternative specifications did not qualitatively
change the estimates.
possibly to increase trial by customers before the regular price increases. This may
mitigate the impact of the price increase in the long run, but by inducing forward-
buying inflates short-run sensitivity to the price change. Secondly, the estimates are
sensitive to the timing of price changes. For example, the retailer may choose to keep
prices low during periods of seasonally high demand (Chevalier, Kashyap, and Rossi,
2003), and wait to apply a price increase as demand returns to baseline levels. As a
result, even short estimation windows may pick up unobserved differences in demand.
In contrast, the IV estimates remove the effects of promotions, and focus on variation
in prices attributable to cost changes.
Table 1.9: RD Estimates, 6-Week Time Window, by Price Changes Included
Matched to
Cost Change
No Matching
Cost Change
National -0.88** -0.84**
No Brand (0.12) (0.14)
Promotional Private -0.29 -1. 17**
Activity Label (0.29) (0.16)
Difference p < 0.10 n.s.
N 7,464 10,440
National -2.35** -2.06**
Promotional Brand (0.15) (0.10)
Activity Private -2.01** -1. 54**
Detected Label (0.20) (0.12)
Difference n.s. p < 0.01
N 9,276 13,740
* Significantly different from zero,
** Significantly different from zero,
p < 0.05
p < 0.01
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on event.
Events were coded as promotional activity were those where paid
prices (net of temporary price promotions) averaged at least 1% less
than regular prices. Events were coded as matched to cost changes
when a corresponding change in wholesale price occurred during the
period from 6 weeks before until the week after the price change.
Table 1.9 re-estimates the model on subsets of the data, categorizing the price
change events based on promotional activity and changes in wholesale price. On one
dimension (the rows of Table 1.9), the sample was split based on whether the event
was influenced by promotions during the estimation window; for events in the bottom
row, average paid prices deviated by more than 1% from regular prices. On the other
dimension (the columns of Table 1.9), the sample was split based on whether the
price change occurred in proximity to cost changes. For events in the left column, the
items had a same-sign change in wholesale price occurring during a window from six
weeks before up until the week after the event; the hope is that the timing of these
price changes is less likely to be determined by demand conditions. The estimates in
the upper-left quadrant of Table 1.9 are closer to the experimental benchmark and
IV estimates, and are slightly smaller in magnitude.
1.5.4 Discussion
The RD analysis treats discrete price change events as quasi-experiments in the short
time frame near the events. As with the IV estimates, these estimates are local to
the price levels when the change occurs, but, unlike the IV estimates, can also be
influenced by the timing of the price changes and short run tactics employed by the
retailer. These additional factors appear to have enough of an effect on demand
during the estimation window that the RD design overestimates price sensitivity, as
compared with the field experiment.
While it is the case that using a subset of the price changes can produce RD esti-
mates consistent with the experimental benchmark, this is an adjustment made using
cost data that was incorporated more efficiently in the IV analysis. By screening
out much of the data, these estimates are inefficient and potentially introduce unan-
ticipated biases. Finally, if we had only been able to compare the full sample RD
estimates to the OLS estimates (Table 1.5), we might have been satisfied by realistic
estimates built on reasonable-sounding assumptions, and adopted somewhat different
estimates.
Despite these problems, the RD analysis complements the other estimation ap-
proaches. The time frames of the various estimates are slightly different: the field
experiment provides a sustained 4-month comparison, with contemporaneous con-
trols, whereas the RD analysis provides short-run snapshots. The IV estimates, in
contrast, are based on the long run movements in costs, prices, and quantities over
many years. Also, the decomposed RD results help illustrate how the IV analysis
removes the effects of promotions and the timing of price changes.
One final concern is that the price effects in the two datasets are not directly com-
parable: the experiment measures the effect of a regular price decrease, whereas the
non-experimental findings are primarily based on price increases. We might expect
these elasticities to vary due to asymmetric reference price effects (see Kalyanaram
and Winer, 1995, for a review; Mazumdar, Raj, and Sinha, 2005, review evidence
on competing explanations), which predict that the field experiment's price decrease
would result in attenuated price sensitivity estimates. Indeed, when the effect of the
field experiment is estimated on a monthly basis, the national brand response does
increase somewhat over the course of the 4-month period. However, the elasticities
in the last month of the 4-month experiment (-1.58 for national brands and -0.17
for private labels) suggest that accounting for asymmetric reference prices would be
unlikely to qualitatively change the experimental estimates. This is because reference
prices are generally formed based on relatively recent observed prices (Briesch, Krish-
namurthi, Mazumdar, and Raj, 1997, suggest 5-6 weeks), and should have adjusted
by the last month of the experiment. The IV estimates are even less likely to be
affected, due to the long-run nature of the prices in the historical data. Reference
price effects could help account for the higher price sensitivities observed in the RD
analysis, but the decomposition of the RD results suggests that other factors played
a larger role.
1.6 Conclusion
We have found that private label demand is less price sensitive than national brand
demand. While previous findings have been ambiguous, we provide robust evidence
from a U.S. retailer. The difference in price sensitivities between private labels and
national brands may reflect a variety of factors, including market structure, hetero-
geneity in consumer preferences, and consumer perceptions of private label products.
This finding suggests that lowering private label prices would not help grow private
label demand, which is surprising given that market-level price sensitivity factors
into long-run private label success (Lamey, Deleersnyder, Dekimpe, and Steenkamp,
2007). The main limitation of the results is that the estimates are local in nature, and
may not predict the results of more drastic changes in pricing policy. In particular,
the private labels in our study are nearly always priced lower than the competing
national brand.
This study makes a methodological contribution by providing the first experimen-
tal validation of a conventional instrumental variables estimator. Previous empirical
research has relied on wholesale prices and commodity prices as instruments. In par-
ticular, research using the Dominick's Finer Foods dataset has used wholesale price
as an instrument, although researchers have expressed concern about the exclusion
restriction (e.g. Chintagunta, 2002)." While the pros and cons of various instru-
ments have been widely discussed, the validity of the available instruments cannot be
determined using standard diagnostics. Our findings provide more confidence in the
use of wholesale price as an instrument in similar retail settings.
Finally, this study belongs to a tradition of using field experiments to validate
non-experimental methods. This paradigm has many potential applications in man-
agement research. The primary limiting factor is the availability of both experimen-
tal and non-experimental data that permit direct comparisons of estimation results.
Overcoming the lack of data requires that academic researchers find partners in indus-
try willing to run experiments. Researchers themselves must be willing to expose their
own methods to more scrutiny. However, an agenda of validation, across a variety of
settings, will provide the foundation for more robust non-experimental research.
14 The Dominick's Finer Foods data is publicly available via the Kilts Center for Marketing, Uni-
versity of Chicago Booth School of Business.
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Chapter 2
Targeted Marketing and Customer
Search
Abstract
It has become common practice for retailers to personalize direct marketing offers
based on customer transaction histories. Targeted email offers featuring products
similar to a customer's previous purchases generate higher response rates, but also
have the potential to affect customer search behavior. A closely matched offer may
encourage a customer to start the search process, leading to increased search activity.
Alternatively, providing customers with closely matched offers may weaken their in-
centives to search beyond the targeted items. In a field experiment using email offers
sent by an online wine retailer, targeted offers result in less search activity on the
retailer's website. In a second study, transaction data from an online ticket exchange
shows that, after receiving targeted offers, customers are less likely to broaden their
purchasing to new genres. These findings indicate that targeted offers carry a hidden
cost: a decrease in customer exploration and discovery.
"Personalized Search for everyone"
- The Official Google Blog, December 4, 2009
2.1 Introduction
Are customers more or less inclined to search when you offer them something they have
bought in the past? Targeted offers featuring products similar to previous purchases
produce higher purchase rates, but also have the potential to affect customer search
behavior. Marketers are forever trying to get their proverbial foot in the door, and will
rely on any advantage to do so. An appeal that is aligned with a customer's revealed
interests may secure the customer's attention, and encourage them to explore the
retailer's other offerings. On the other hand, by emphasizing products from a familiar
category, a targeted offer could result in quick evaluation and curtailed search for
other products. This investigation finds that targeted email offers result in decreased
search activity on the retailer's own website, which leaves customers purchasing from
a narrower range of products.
The trend towards personalization is nearly universal online, and shows no signs
of slowing. As of late 2009, personalized search results became the default mode of
operation on Google. For example, if a user tends to click on recipes from Epicuri-
ous.com, that site would be ranked higher in subsequent recipe searches. While this
trend has generated many useful innovations, a risk of increasingly accurate person-
alization is that "there's less room for the chance encounters that bring insight and
learning" (Pariser, 2011). This notion could apply to citizens learning about different
perspectives or scientists learning about new research (Van Alstyne and Brynjolfsson,
2005, 1996); it could also apply to consumers learning about new products.
Online shopping has provided better access to a wide range of niche products,
which has necessitated tools to help manage the time and effort of search (Bryn-
jolfsson, Hu, and Smith, 2003). Retailers have quickly adopted various forms of
personalization, which have enormous potential to create value. Targeted offers are
one form of personalization, which can improve the efficiency of a retailer's communi-
cations to its customers. It is natural to expect that relevant offers can help retailers
win a larger share of customers' limited time and attention. Why would a customer
spend time with a retailer that does not understand his or her needs? However, if
customers receiving targeted offers carry out less active search, relevance could under-
mine engagement. When retailers treat customers as passive agents, the customers
may respond by behaving more passively.
This article presents empirical evidence from two complementary studies. The first
is a field experiment run with the cooperation of an online wine retailer. Detailed
web browsing data showed that targeted emails decreased customer search activity on
the retailer's website. In particular, the experiment found a decrease in exploratory
search that could expose customers to new products. The second study used data on
experimental email marketing campaigns run by StubHub, an online ticket exchange.
Analysis of the StubHub data shows that, after receiving targeted offers, customers
are less likely to buy products from new categories. Together, these findings imply
that retailers should balance the need for immediate sales response with measures
that encourage exploration and sustain customer interest.
These findings have important implications for targeted marketing. As targeted
offers become increasingly prevalent in online retailing, it is important to understand
the potential tradeoffs that are involved. Perhaps the most basic is the tradeoff
between exploration and exploitation of information about customers' preferences.
However, the costs of too little exploration can be difficult to detect, because they are
not directly observed, and retailers can end up taking too few risks in their targeted
offers. These studies reveal the opportunity costs of targeting as they are reflected in
customer search behavior and subsequent purchasing patterns. These could in turn
affect long-run customer behavior and the information available for future targeting
decisions.
This article also contributes to the literature on customer search. There is a
long tradition of research on how customer search is affected by prior knowledge and
customer differences. More recently, the effect of the Internet on customer search
has become an important topic. Search tools have been found to improve search
efficiency, creating value by saving time and effort for customers managing specific
goals (Hiubl and Trifts, 2000). This investigation provides a different perspective,
which looks beyond the immediate purchase occasion. Increased search could lead to
consideration of a broader range of products, and build customer knowledge for future
occasions. From the retailer's perspective, broader awareness could generate cross-
selling opportunities and increase sales diversity, improving customer retention and
lifetime value. If targeted offers lead to less search, the retailer sacrifices opportunities
to bring attention to products for which a customer has low awareness. Thus, retailers
have strong incentives to learn how their actions affect customer search activity.
The following section reviews previous research and offers predictions on how tar-
geted offers might affect customer search. Section 3 presents the field experiment on
browsing behavior conducted with the wine retailer. Section 4 presents the analy-
sis of how targeting affects subsequent purchasing in the StubHub data. Section 5
concludes with a discussion of the implications.
2.2 Background and Predictions
2.2.1 Previous Research
Research on targeted offers has largely focused on estimating the effect on customers'
direct response, with the objective of maximizing short-run profits. Arora et al.
(2008) provides a recent review. The literature has long held that effective use of
historical response to personalize marketing tactics can improve subsequent response
(Rossi, McCulloch, and Allenby, 1996; Ansari and Mela, 2003). Intuitively, targeted
offers matched to customers' transaction histories should result in higher response
rates. If the customer of a wine store has purchased a lot of French wine, an offer
featuring French wine generates higher response than a wine from another region.
In this article, 'targeting' will refer to the practice of offering customers products
that are similar to products they have previously purchased. This arrangement may
not be universal: for instance, suppose that wine preferences are homogenous, but
consumers are variety-seeking. In this scenario, customers owning cellars stocked
with French wine would have lower response rates for French wine offers. However,
recent evidence has found that personalized loyalty promotions, offering products that
customers had previously purchased, were more effective than competitive promotions
offering competing products, particularly in online stores (Zhang and Wedel, 2009).
A parallel stream of research has brought attention to the limitations and draw-
backs of various forms of targeting. For example, privacy concerns have been found
to produce negative reactions when targeted ads become obtrusive (Goldfarb and
Tucker, 2011). It has also been found that very specific targeted ads perform poorly
on customers in the early stages of the buying process (Lambrecht and Tucker, 2011).
When customers are in the awareness and consideration stage of the process, it turns
out that general information about a brand or firm is more useful than very spe-
cific product information, even when the specific information pertains to products
in which a customer has shown interest. Targeting could affect ongoing profitability
due to strategic concerns. Personalization could increase competition due to lessened
differentiation, as competing firms end up providing similarly personalized offerings
to a given customer (Zhang, 2011).
This article investigates an important factor for marketers to consider that has
been largely overlooked: targeted marketing activity is likely to affect customer search
activity. Whereas Lambrecht and Tucker (2011) look at how targeting response de-
pends on the state of the customer, the question here is how targeting affects the
state of the customer. Customer search has long been an important area of research
in marketing, and many factors that affect search activity have been previously docu-
mented (Punj and Staelin, 1983; Beatty and Smith, 1987; Srinivasan and Ratchford,
1991; Moorthy, Ratchford, and Talukdar, 1997). This discussion focuses on the ways
in which targeted offers from a retailer could result in either increased or decreased
search activity.
Previous research has examined how the Internet and information technology have
affected search behavior. Hiubl and Trifts (2000) looked at how recommendation
agents (algorithms that provide personalized lists of recommended products) and
comparison matrices (which typically line up alternatives in columns, and attributes
in rows) affect online shopping behavior. They found that these tools allowed cus-
tomers to search more efficiently, making better purchase decisions while reducing the
number of alternatives they viewed. Diehl (2005) looked at how in an ordered envi-
ronment (where alternatives are ranked according to user preferences), lower search
costs could result in increased search. This could even result in worse purchase de-
cisions if consumers consider too many options, lowering the quality of their choice
set. Targeted offers can be seen as another form of decision aid; these two exam-
ples show that search tools can either increase or decrease search, depending on the
circumstances.
There are also related findings on how search tools affect sales diversity. Brynjolf-
sson, Hu, and Simester (2011) found that lower search costs can increase sales of niche
products. They link this effect to the use of tools such as recommendation agents and
non-directed searches. Fleder and Hosanagar (2009) show that recommender systems
can theoretically lower aggregate sales diversity, even while increasing individual-
level diversity. In addition, they show that if recommendations affect choice through
salience or persuasion (rather than just improving awareness), customers could be
made worse off. Fleder and Hosanagar (2009) focus on the direct impact of recom-
mendations, and do not consider how recommendations might interact with customer
search. This article provides empirical evidence, and examines the customers' active
role. Brynjolfsson, Hu, and Simester (2011) analysis treats search activity as exoge-
nous, while this article looks at how the retailer's actions can affect customers' use of
these tools.
2.2.2 Increased Search Following Targeted Offers
One way we might expect targeted offers to affect search activity is through the initial
decision to search. An offer that is aligned with the customer's preferences should
generate more interest in the offered product. In the course of evaluating the offer,
the customer may search for additional information. In the case of an email offer,
this would result in more visits to the retailer's website, and increased viewing of the
offered product's information.
Returning to the foot-in-the-door analogy, increased interest in the offer could
generate spillovers as customers extend their sessions to search for other items. Dhar,
Huber, and Khan (2007) showed that offering something that is more likely to be pur-
chased can create "shopping momentum," which makes additional purchasing more
likely. Retailers routinely use promotions to attract customers in the hopes that they
will also consider other products; in some cases, they may even price signpost items
at a loss (Hess and Gerstner, 1987; Lal and Matutes, 1994). Empirical studies sug-
gest that promotions do increase store traffic, although they do not always increase
net profits (Walters and Rinne, 1986; Gijsbrechts, Campo, and Goossens, 2003). A
targeted offer could be a more effective way of attracting customer attention, either
in combination with or as an alternative to deep discounting. This would result in
increased overall search activity following a targeted offer.
2.2.3 Decreased Search Following Targeted Offers
Alternatively, targeted offers may decrease the amount of search by reducing the
expected benefit of continued search. This prediction meshes well with cost-benefit
models of search. For example, in a sequential search setting, where customers draw
options from some distribution one at a time, finding a higher-valued option is more
likely to terminate the search process (Weitzman, 1979). By providing something
interesting, a targeted offer makes it harder to find something more interesting, low-
ering the continuation value of search. In a model of consideration set formation,
having high-valued options already in the consideration set makes it less worthwhile
to evaluate products to potentially add to the set (Hauser and Wernerfelt, 1990).
Thus, targeted offers could induce customers to end the search process more quickly,
and shift their attention to the purchase decision.
By expediting the buying process from the search stage to evaluation, targeted
offers could restrict the scope of search by preempting exploratory search. The cus-
tomers may still need to perform directed search (or pre-purchase search), to help eval-
uate specific alternatives. However, customers also regularly engage in non-directed,
exploratory search (or ongoing search), which is less goal-driven, and motivated by
curiosity and a desire to gather information for future decisions (Bloch, Sherrell, and
Ridgway, 1986; Moe, 2003). While most research has focused on directed search,
retailer actions affect exploratory search as well; for example, the visual layout of
product information can affect the intensity of exploratory search (Janiszewski, 1998).
Targeted offers may result in less of the exploratory search that would expose cus-
tomers to a broader range of products. For an online retailer, this would result in
fewer page views at the category levels.
The factors identified in this section are supported by the literature and could
either increase or decrease customer search activity. A summary of these effects is
listed in Table 2.1. Whether the net effect of a targeted offer is higher or lower search
activity, and whether it affects customer purchasing of new products, are empirical
questions addressed by the remainder of this article.
Table 2.1: Predicted Effects of Targeted Offers on Search
Increased search following targeted offer
More likely to initiate search, due to interest in the offer
Increased duration, due to shopping momentum
Decreased search following targeted offer
Decreased duration, due to lower continuation value of search
Narrower scope, due to shift away from exploration
2.3 The Effect of Targeting on Search
This section reports the results of a field experiment conducted with the cooperation
of an online wine retailer. Targeted marketing tactics naturally introduce selection
effects, a form of endogeneity that make it difficult to estimate causal effects of target-
ing. For example, if an offer for NFL tickets is sent to all customers who previously
bought NFL tickets, and no other customers, naive estimates of the offer's effect
would be biased. The NFL customers may end up purchasing more NFL tickets than
customers who did not get the offer, but the difference in response would be at least
partly attributable to the difference in customer preferences.
Hartmann, Nair, and Narayanan (2010) provided empirical examples of how se-
lection effects result in biased estimates of the effects of targeted offers. Arora et al.
(2008) recommend field tests as a means of isolating the effects of personalization.
One example involving targeted marketing communications is Malthouse and Elsner
(2006), who showed how personalized marketing copy accompanying a catalog selling
books and music can increase sales. Customers all received the same catalog, but a
personalized cover letter addressed segments based on their preferred genres. Thus,
field experiments are an ideal approach for studying the effects of targeted offers.
The retail wine market is an appropriate setting for the experiment, and has
previously been used to study customer search (Lynch Jr. and Ariely, 2000). Most
wine retailers carry a wide assortment of products, which are differentiated across
many attributes. As a result, customer search is a nontrivial task, especially for fine
wines where consumer involvement is high (Beatty and Smith, 1987). Due to the high
information load, the cooperating retailer relies heavily on email marketing to drive
website traffic and sales. While they receive feedback in the form of resulting sales,
the firm does not know how these activities affect other behavior.
The purpose of this study is to estimate the effect of a targeted offer on customer
search activity. If the primary effect of targeted offers on search is to drive traffic, a
targeted offer should increase search for other products. On the other hand, if evalu-
ation of the offer exhausts customers' limited attention, it would result in decreased
search activity following a targeted offer. To investigate, customers were randomly
assigned to receive either a targeted or untargeted offer by email. Web server log data
from associated website sessions were used to evaluate the effect of targeted offers on
browsing behavior.
2.3.1 Experimental Design
The retailer typically designs its targeting based on relatively simple rules with re-
spect to a customer's profile. For example, an Italian offer may be sent to anyone
who purchased over $1,000 worth of Italian wine in the past year. The retailer also
screens mailing lists based on average price paid, to avoid sending offers from in-
appropriate price tiers. The experimental sample includes customers with varying
historical purchasing profiles. The sample was limited to customers who opted in to
receive promotional emails, purchased at least $400 of French or Italian wines within
the past 12 months, and paid average prices below $100 per bottle.
Each customer in the field experiment was randomly selected to receive an offer
featuring either wine from Napa Valley or French wine from Bordeaux. They both
featured red wine, of similar quality, in the $30-$50 price range. Targeted customers,
identified as primarily French wine buyers, were randomly assigned to the treatment
condition (FR offer) or control condition (CA offer). Customers who historically
bought Italian wines were considered non-targeted, and were also randomly assigned
to receive one of the offers. These customers serve as a non-targeted control group, as
the effect of targeting is an interaction between customer type and the corresponding
offer type.
The sample included relatively few customers identified as primarily U.S. wine
buyers. Customers who historically purchased mostly U.S. wines were excluded from
the analysis to avoid concerns about the direction of the experimental treatment.1
'See Imbens and Angrist (1994) for a discussion about the monotonicity of an intervention.
For the remaining customers, there is a sense in which customers assigned to receive
the French offer were "more targeted" than those who received the California offer.
Table 2.2: Pre-
targeted (IT)
Test Measures,
Groups
Targeted (FR) and Non-
FR Buyer IT Buyer Difference
FR Amount 2,044.7 70.7 1, '(128.3)
54.8**FR Bottles 59.5 4.70 (2.91)(2.91)
US Amount 143.3 119.0 20.1(20.1)
US Bottles 4.91 5.01 -0.10(0.62)
Browse/Search 0.18 0.20 -0.017
Views (0.107)
Orders 0.001 0.002 -0.001
Placed (0.002)
N, FR Offer 547 484
N, US Offer 534 512
N, Total 1,081 996
Standard errors in parentheses.
Note: Sample includes Customers who bought at least $400 of
either French or Italian wine (but not both).
The offers were delivered by email, and were not otherwise featured on the website.
A web beacon, which is a snippet of code embedded in each email specific to each
email address, is used by the retailer to track email opening statistics. The opening
rate of roughly 31% did not differ across conditions. Recipients could respond by
replying to the email, calling customer service, or clicking through to the retailer's
website, which would bring them to a landing page specific to the offer. The majority
of the activity related to the retailer's typical email offer occurs within the two days
following the mailing. The analysis of the experiment is limited to a three day window
following the mailing.
The data includes detailed web browsing data linked to specific individuals, along
with their purchasing profiles and transactions occurring during the observation pe-
riod. This link is inferred through email web beacon, IP address, and timing, so it
does not require that a session originates from an email click through (they could
read the email and visit the site by typing the website address, using a search engine,
or using a bookmark). The server requests were parsed to generate several variables
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Figure 2-1: Targeting Response Compared to Untargeted Control Group Response
describing user activity, which are listed in Table B.1 in the Appendix. Server logs
were available for about 17 days, and session-level summary statistics for some of
these measures are provided in Table B.2, also in the Appendix.
Table 2.2 shows several pre-test measures for the two groups. By construction,
the French buyers purchased far more French wine in the previous 12 months. The
French and Italian customers differed only slightly on 12 month U.S. purchasing. 2
The two groups were also similar on measures of website behavior in the week prior
to the experiment. Overall search activity, labeled "Browse/Search Views," is the
number of page views that include browsing, search result, and product pages. There
was no difference in the purchasing rate between the two groups. These comparisons
support the assertion that a difference in response for the two groups is attributable
to the difference in their preference for French wine. Finally, roughly half of each
group was assigned to receive each of the two offers. The same measures were not
significantly different across randomly assigned offers (Table B.3, in the Appendix).
2.3.2 Results
The analysis focuses on two key measures of website activity. The first is "Browse/
Search Views," which is the subset of page views that includes browsing the selection
of products, viewing search results, and viewing product pages. This does not include
more openly promoted content, such as email offers and features on the home page,
so this measure captures the customer's active role in search. "Test Item Views"
denotes the number of page views for the offer's landing page. The web address
for the landing page was only available through the offer emails, so this provides a
measure of interest in the email offer. The first independent variable is the customer
group, which can be targeted ("FR Buyer") and non-targeted. The second variable
is the offer they received, treatment ("FR Offer") and control. The parameter of
interest is the interaction of the two variables; the interaction term captures the
effect of targeting, while controlling for group and offer averages.
2This analysis excludes those who bought $400 of both French and Italian wines; coding these cus-
tomers as French buyers, as they were ostensibly part of the target segment, increases the statistical
Browse/Search Views Test Offer Views
Table 2.3: The Effect of Targeting on Search
Browse/Search Test Offer
Views Views
FR Offer x -0.2779* 0.0251*
FR Buyer (0.1373) (0.0121)
0.2066* -0.0014
(0.0991) (0.0088)
0.0435 -0.0098FR Buyer (0.0967) (0.0085)
0.0352 0.0117tIntercept (0.0691) (0.0061)
t Different from zero, p < 0.10; * different from
zero, p < 0.05. Robust standard errors in parenthe-
ses.
Note: Sample includes customers who bought $400
of either French or Italian wine (N = 2,077).
The average levels of these measures are depicted in Figure 2-1. The control
group did not visit the landing page for the French offer any more or less than the
California offer, but were more likely to conduct additional search after receiving
the French offer. This suggests that the French offer was better at driving traffic in
general. However, the French buyers, who were more likely to visit the landing page
for the French offer, were less likely to search for other products afterwards. The
regression estimates are presented in Table 2.3.
The negative interaction coefficient for browse/search views indicates that target-
ing resulted in sharply lower search activity. The contrast between the two groups'
response is striking; they were closely matched samples on attributes other than their
regional preference in wine, they were sent the same emails, and they had access to
the same retail website. This supports the prediction that targeted offers suppress
search for other products. The targeted offer did have a higher click-through rate, as
the views for the landing page were highest for targeted customers in the treatment
condition. This confirms that the targeting manipulation generated higher interest
in the offered item, and increased evaluation of the offer. However, the pattern of re-
sults contradicts the prediction that targeted offers generate spillovers; to the extent
that interest in the targeted item can stimulate search for other items, the effect is
swamped by the inhibitory effect of targeting.
power of the estimates but also unbalances the sample.
2.3.3 Source of the Effects
The decrease in search following a targeted offer occurs despite similar email viewing
rates (about 31%) across conditions. This suggests that the targeted offer only affects
the behavior of customers after they have processed the email; while the amount of
attention they give the offer may vary, the different groups are exposed to the offer at
the same rate. Thus, the decrease in the overall amount of search could be because
targeted customers are less likely to begin searching, or because they do not search
as much when they do initiate a session. To investigate, a zero-inflated Poisson (ZIP)
model was used to jointly estimate the effect of targeting on the initiation of search,
and the amount of search conditional on initiating search. This approach uses a logit
model to estimate the probability that a customer belongs to a class of 'non-searchers.'
The non-searchers collectively result in more observations of zero browse/search views
than would be predicted by a Poisson process. Estimates using the rate of visiting
the website as a dependent measure are included for comparison.
Table 2.4: Decomposition of the Change in Search Activity
Browse/Search Views ZIP Model
Non-searchers
(Logit)
Browse/Search
(Poisson)
FR Offer x -0.0270 0.245 -4.062**
FR Buyer (0.0237) (1.085) (1.101)
FR Offer 0.0291 -0.502 1.433*(0.0181) (0.576) (0.585)
-0.0068 0.074 0.878FR Buyer (0.0159) (0.637) (0.691)
0.0742** 4.588** 1.250**Intercept (0.0116) (0.452) (0.410)
* different from zero, p < 0.05; ** different from zero, p < 0.01. Robust
standard errors in parentheses.
Note: Sample includes customers who bought $400 of either French or
Italian wine (N = 2,077). A zero-inflated negative binomial regression
produced very similar results.
The parameter estimates of the decomposed effect of targeting on search are re-
ported in Table 2.4 and the predicted rates of search are reported in Table 2.5. The
differences in the visiting rate following the targeted offer are negative and not signif-
icant, which contradicts the original prediction that a targeted offer should increase
website traffic. It also does not support the possibility that targeted offers decrease
search by reducing the initiation of search. The non-searcher component of the ZIP
model mirrors the visiting rate estimates; again, targeting is not found to have a
strong effect on initiation of search (the signs are reversed relative to the visit rate
estimates, because this equation estimates the probability of being a non-searcher).
Visited
(OLS)
Table 2.5: Effects on Predicted Rate of Search
Non-targeted Targeted
(IT Buyer) (FR Buyer) Difference
Control 3.49 8.40 4.91
(CA Offer) (1.43) (4.67) (4.89)
Treatment 14.62 0.61 -14.02*
(FR Offer) (6.09) (0.45) (6.11)
11.13t _7.79t -18.93*
Difference (6.26) (4.69) (7.82)
t Different from zero, p < 0.10; * different from zero, p < 0.05.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Note: Rate of search is predicted Poisson parameter from
browse/search equation in ZIP model (Table 2.4).
In contrast, the Poisson equation finds that the targeted offer resulted in less search
for customers who were not inferred to be non-searchers. 3 This is consistent with
the prediction that receiving an attractive offer lowers the incremental benefit of ad-
ditional search (the continuation value of search); a customer is less likely to find a
better deal than the targeted offer. Customers may be more likely to evaluate the
offer based on the content of the email or the landing page, and immediately decide
whether to buy or not.
The decomposition analysis suggests that the targeted offer is changing the type
of search in which customers engage. As proposed earlier, one way in which targeted
offers might change the nature of customer visits is by shifting their attention from
exploration to evaluation. To investigate, broader search focused on wine regions,
varietals, or styles was classified as non-directed search, in contrast to narrower, more
explicit queries for specific products or producers, or directed search. The same
measure of non-directed search has been associated with more diverse sales patterns
in the Internet channel, suggesting that it is an important part of exploratory search
(Brynjolfsson, Hu, and Simester, 2011).
Using non-directed search as the dependent measure, it appears that a large frac-
tion of the decrease in search following a targeted offer can be attributed to less
general search at the category level (Table 2.6). A similar directional pattern was
found for directed search, but the effect of targeting was not significant. A likely ex-
planation is related to the low amount of directed search across all conditions; email
offers do not appear to generate much search for specific alternatives, and the odds
3Note that the ZIP model is estimating interaction effects in non-linear equations, which compli-
cates the interpretation of the coefficients (Ai and Norton, 2003). A proper test for an interaction
compares the marginal effect of the treatment on the expected number of browse/search views for
the two groups of customers. The marginal effect is positive for the non-targeted group, negative
for the targeted group, and the difference (targeted minus non-targeted) is negative and significant
(z = 2.42).
Table 2.6: The Effect on Non-directed Search
Broad Narrow
(Non-directed) (Directed)
Browse/Search Browse/Search
FR Offer x -0.1302* -0.0298
FR Buyer (0.0658) (0.0223)
0.0853f 0.0316*
(0.0475) (0.0161)
0.0352 -0.0079
(0.0463) (0.0157)
0.0098 0.0098Intercept (0.0331) (0.0112)
t Different from zero, p < 0.10; * different from zero, p <
0.05; ** different from zero, p < 0.01. Robust standard
errors in parentheses.
Note: Sample includes customers who bought $400 of
either French or Italian wine (N = 2,077).
of catching independent directed search activity in the short observation period are
probably low to begin with. The remainder of overall search activity is mostly prod-
uct views. These page views can result from either directed or non-directed search,
and reflect the combined pattern of search activity.
2.3.4 Robustness
The finding that targeting reduces search activity runs counter to the strong intu-
ition that a more attractive, targeted offer would encourage customers to look at
the retailer's other items. One concern is the possibility that the offer was poorly
received by the targeted customers. Due to their expertise in the category, or their
high standards for products in the category, targeted customers may be capable of
evaluating and rejecting unattractive offers more quickly. This could result in more
hits on the landing page for targeted customers, but less additional search. However,
if this were the case, we would expect to see no difference in sales response for tar-
geted customers, or even a negative effect. An examination of sales for the offered
items finds that targeting was associated with higher sales (Figure 2-2; also see third
column of Tables 2.7 and 2.8). Although the difference in sales from the control group
is only marginally significant, the decrease in search is unlikely to have been caused
by a strong negative reaction to the targeted offer.
The advantage of comparing the French buyers to the Italian buyers is that it
controls for aspects of French wine or the French wine offer that encourage customer
search. For example, though an effort was made to design similar offers, the copy for
the French offer was longer (568 words to 462 for the California offer), and may have
Test Offer Sales
10
8
6 -
4 -
2 -
0
IT Buyer FR Buyer
m CA Offer nFR Offer
Figure 2-2: Targeting Sales Response
been more likely to include content that sparks additional search. However, there
may be differences between the two groups other than how closely the offers match
their purchasing profiles. To explore this possibility, several pre-test control variables
were included in the regressions, and were interacted with the response variables
from the base model. Sales for the test offer are also included, to see if there the
pretest measures influence the sales patterns. Multiple specifications of including the
control variables did not qualitatively change the results; the most straightforward
specification is reported in Table 2.7 (the coefficients on the controls are reported in
Table B.4, in the Appendix).
Table 2.7: Regressions With Pre-test Controls
Browse/Search Test Offer Test Offer
Views Views Sales
FR Offer -0.2353* 0.0238* 5.4492t
x FR Buyer (0.1186) (0.0112) (3.2818)
FR Offer 0.1663 -0.0006 0.6598(0.1061) (0.0070) (2.3859)
FR Buyer 0.0430 -0.0082 0.0000(0.0560) (0.0059) (2.3071)
Intercept 0. 03 2 5 t 0.010 4 t 0.0000(0.0182) (0.0055) (1.6569)
t Different from zero, p < 0.10; * different from zero, p < 0.05; **
different from zero, p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parenthe-
ses.
Note: Sample includes customers who bought $400 of either French
or Italian wine (N = 2,077). Controls included standardized
amount spent, bottles purchased, and average price paid for pre-
vious 12 months, interacted with FR Offer, FR Buyer, and FR
Offer x FR Buyer. Coefficients reported in Appendix (Table B.4).
While the addition of control variables did not affect the results, this is not un-
expected, as the two groups were closely balanced on pre-test measures. However,
there could also be unobserved factors that systematically differ between the groups.
For example, French buyers may be more accustomed to personalized service, and
so are less prone to search on their own. Alternatively, French buyers could have
narrower preferences, and are thus less interested in exploring other products. Either
of these stories would predict a flatter search response to targeting relative to the
Italian buyers. This is roughly consistent with the observed pattern in Figure 2-1;
Italian buyers searched more for the French offer relative to the control offer, while
the French buyers searched only slightly less. These alternative explanations reflect
the inherent difficulty of estimating causal effects of targeting, because selection ef-
fects are deliberately introduced, and unobserved (and unanticipated) factors could
be correlated with preferences. However, a feature common to the most plausible
alternative explanations is that the targeted customers are unlikely to search after
receiving any offer. If this is the case, the "more French" a customer is, the less
responsive their search activity should be to which offer they receive.
Table 2.8 shows the response for the sample of French wine buyers split approx-
imately by the median 12-month expenditure on French wine. This resulted in cus-
tomers who spent from $400 to $1,100 (the 'low' group) and customers who spent over
$1,100 (the 'high' group). The independent variables are an indicator for whether a
customer was in the high group, the offer they received (treatment and control), and
the interaction. The interaction term represents how the targeting response changes
as the strength of the targeting manipulation increases.
Table 2.8: Regressions on French Customers
Browse/Search Test Offer Test Offer
Views Views Sales
FR Offer x -0.2325* 0.0062 9.3271*
High Group (0.1104) (0.0151) (4.7187)
FR Offer 0.0239 0.0175t 1.6800(0.0269) (0.0093) (3.3457)
High Group 0.2169* 0.0066 0.3553(0.1069) (0.0058) (3.3475)
Intercept 0.0155 0.0022 0.0000(0.0135) (0.0022) (2.3736)
t Different from zero, p < 0.10; * different from zero, p < 0.05.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Note: Sample includes customers who bought $400 of French wine
(N = 1, 826). High group denotes customers who bought $1,100 of
French wine (918 customers).
Both groups show a slight increase in test offer views in the treatment condition,
with no difference in response between the two groups. However, only the high
group shows a reliable increase in purchasing for the targeted offer. The interaction
coefficient for browse/search views is again negative, indicating that the stronger
targeting manipulation results in a larger drop in search activity. The pattern of
results is inconsistent with explanations that claim French buyers do not like to search,
as the "more French" high group buyers actually conduct more search than the low
group when receiving the control offer. Also, the change in search activity between
the control and treatment conditions is larger for the heavy French buyers, which is
inconsistent with explanations that French buyers' search activity is somehow less
responsive to retailer actions. These estimates support the proposed interpretation
of the primary analysis: targeting caused the decrease in search activity.
2.3.5 Discussion
The results of the experiment indicate that targeted customers were more likely to
seriously evaluate an email offer, and purchase the offer at a higher rate. However,
overall search activity was lower for the targeted customers. Additional measures
of search, the proportion of page views spent on search and the amount of non-
directed search, suggest that the reduction in search reflects a shift from exploration
to evaluation when customers receive targeted offers.
While targeted offers seem to have reduced the scope of search, the findings are also
consistent with an increase in search efficiency. The most interested customers may
also be the most knowledgeable, and may already have access to enough information
to evaluate the offer, or require less effort to evaluate the offer (Bettman and Park,
1980; Brucks, 1985).' For example, if a high-end French wine buyer receives an offer
for a first-growth Bordeaux, and wants to check the availability of other first-growth
Bordeaux, the customer may be able to recall and type in their names rather than
navigate through several layers of categorization. This raises an important question:
if targeted offers result in less search, is it simply because personalization has saved
the customer time, or is there potentially useful information that they would have
been exposed to had they conducted more search and evaluated other products?
Some of the previous mentioned research has found that appropriately deployed
search tools mainly save time. In the case of Hiubl and Trifts (2000), additional
search in the absence of tools turns out to be wasted effort, and in Diehl (2005) excess
search even resulted in worse decisions. However, research on website conversion has
shown that cumulative time spent on a site increases a customer's propensity to make
purchases (Moe and Fader, 2004). Assuming that consumers retain some surplus in
these transactions, this implies that search activity can provide persistent benefits for
decision making.
If targeted offers narrow the scope of search in a meaningful way, there would be
implications for the discovery of new products. Non-directed search has previously
been found to lead to increased sales of less popular products (Brynjolfsson, Hu, and
4The literature also finds that customers with very low knowledge may also search less and rely
more on prior information, because they lack the ability to process new information; this article
is more focused on experienced customers with established purchasing histories, rather than novice
consumers.
Simester, 2011). If customers visit the retailer's site to evaluate targeted offers, but are
less prone to explore, they would be less likely to learn about products from categories
other than those offered. This could result in less diverse purchasing at the customer
level. A particular targeted offer would be less likely to generate consideration and
sales of products in categories that the customer has not purchased in the past.
Research on recommender systems has recognized that accuracy of predicted pref-
erences is not the only criterion for evaluating recommendation quality, because it is
not sufficient to achieve the ultimate goal of encouraging discovery. In particular,
novelty (the ability to make recommendations the user was not already aware of) and
serendipity (the ability to make surprising recommendations that are also interesting
to the user) are desirable features (Herlocker, Konstan, Terveen, and Riedl, 2004).
Measures of novelty look at how much a recommendation increases a user's awareness,
and measures of serendipity look at whether a user's interests become broader over
time. Analogously, if customer purchasing becomes broader following a non-targeted
offer, but not after a targeted offer, we can infer that targeting does have a meaningful
impact on the scope of search.
The following section presents an analysis of data from a different retailer, Stub-
Hub, which included detailed transaction data.5 The results suggest that targeted
offers do indeed affect customers' tendency to purchase from new categories.
2.4 The Effect of Targeting on Subsequent Pur-
chasing
StubHub is a website that allows users to buy and sell event tickets. The firm is con-
cerned that they do not understand the potential long-term effects of their relationship
marketing policies, and so it has provided data on buyer-side direct marketing ac-
tivities to academic researchers through the Wharton Customer Analytics Initiative.
This data includes experimental email promotions that included randomly assigned
holdout groups. Some of the campaigns were specific to certain genres (e.g. NFL
tickets).
The objective of this study is to determine whether targeted offers, where a genre-
specific offer matched a customer's buying history, affect the likelihood that customers
purchase from other genres. If targeted offers affect search primarily by narrowing the
scope of search, it would result in less purchasing of new genres, because the targeted
customers are less likely to evaluate and consider other products. If targeted offers
affect search activity primarily by increasing search efficiency, targeted customers
should be just as likely to purchase new genres as non-targeted customers. There
should be no difference in the effect on purchasing for other genres that the customer
has historically purchased, because these genres are likely to already be part of the
customer's consideration set. The following analysis compares the medium-term pur-
chasing behavior for targeted and non-targeted customers for several genre-specific
5Complete data on the wine store customers' purchasing behavior was unavailable. There were
no differences in purchases of other (non-offer) products during the 3-day observation period.
offers.
2.4.1 Data
The StubHub dataset tracks a sample of customers over time, including information
on their transactions, genre preferences, offer history, and email history. The cus-
tomers have been added to the sample in cohorts of 2,000 new users per month over
a four-year period, resulting in nearly 96,000 customers. The genre preferences are a
series of flags that are either inferred when a customer makes a purchase from a par-
ticular genre, or are explicitly set by the customer (explicitly set preferences make up
about 1% of the recorded genre preferences). The offer history includes information
on a series of promotional campaigns that were tested on this group of customers.
Altogether, there were 51 campaigns that were sent to customers by email and in-
cluded randomly assigned holdout groups. The email history tracks all email traffic
from StubHub to the customer, including updates and newsletters outside the scope
of the offer program.
The offers typically provided a discount of 5% or 10%, or free shipping, and some
were eligible for orders above minimum dollar amounts, or for certain types of events.
The focus of this analysis is on several large-scale campaigns that targeted specific
genres. A genre is defined by the sports league for athletic events (e.g. NFL football
or college football are separate genres), and are split into concerts and theater for
cultural events. Subgenres are recorded for specific teams or performance artists.
The distribution of transactions, genre preferences, and genre-specific campaigns are
shown in Table 2.9.
Table 2.9: StubHub Genre Distribution
Number Genre Targeted # Eligible
Genre of Orders Preference Campaigns Customers
MLB 70,804 111,172 3 3,986
Concerts 28,704 64,874 1 9,709
NFL 17,843 36,713 2 15,088
NBA 17,783 35,218 1 5,680
NHL 14,136 25,838 1 3,206
College Football 10,390 20,591 1 8,925
Theater 5,593 6,629 2 3,270
All Other Sports 5,009 9,856 2 566
College Basketball 4,948 11,783 0 0
Motorsports 1,216 2,885 0 0
Total 170,262 310,891 13 50,430
Note: Targeted campaigns include any emailed offers employing holdout groups
that were targeted at customers of a particular genre. Eligible customers include all
customers that were included in the offer or holdout group for a campaign.
For each campaign, the size of the holdout sample was about 10% of the eligible
customers. In addition, the majority of customers eligible for genre-specific offers
were considered targeted, because their genre preferences matched the offers. About
28% of the eligible customers were considered not targeted, which allows estimates
of the impact of targeting. However, their smaller proportion, combined with the
small proportion of the holdout group, made it difficult to obtain precise estimates of
these customers' response to individual offers. To ensure a sufficiently large sample,
the four largest campaigns were pooled and analyzed together. Information on these
campaigns is shown in Table 2.10. These campaigns accounted for nearly half the
data on genre-specific campaigns, were conducted within a few months of each other,
hopefully minimizing seasonal differences, and appear to have been implemented using
similar procedures, as StubHub's descriptions of these campaigns are very similar.
The analysis focuses on customers who were considered active by the company, as
they were simultaneously testing their promotions on inactive customers.6
Table 2.10: Campaigns
Duration Full Active Active
Campaign Start Date (Days) Genre Sample Offer Holdout
A 9/17/2010 14 NFL 9,037 5,934 664
B 10/21/2010 11 Col. Football 8,925 6,131 692
C 11/29/2010 15 Concerts 9,709 6,391 736
D 11/18/2010 15 NFL 6,051 4,168 448
Note: Active customers designated by StubHub based on transaction histories.
The random assignment to the holdout group appears to have been successful.
Table B.5, in the Appendix, compares several pre-test measures for the customers as-
signed to the holdout group and customers receiving the offer. None of the differences
between the group means were statistically significant or of meaningful magnitude.
2.4.2 Results
The dependent measure for the analysis is an indicator variable for whether the
customer made a purchase from a new genre during an extended period of 28 days from
the start of the offer. A new genre is defined as a genre which the customer has not
previously purchased through StubHub, and has not explicitly set a preference for in
their account settings. This variable also excludes the target genre itself, so purchasing
the target genre would not be considered a new genre for either the targeted or non-
targeted customers. The time frame eliminates the overlap of observation periods,
as some customers were included in more than one campaign. Although two of the
campaigns started within 28 days of each other (campaigns C and D), these had no
overlap in eligible customers. Preliminary analysis showed that the effects of an offer
6 Whether due to sample size or lack of interest, offer response of any kind was difficult to estimate
reliably for inactive customers.
on new genre purchasing are strongest after the end of the offer period, but the post-
period purchases are pooled with activity during the offer period to ensure that the
observed effects are not due to inter-temporal substitution.
Three other sets of purchasing are also considered. The second response variable
indicates whether the customer made any purchase. The third indicates whether the
customer purchased tickets within the genre specified in the offer. The last variable
indicates whether the customer purchased tickets for a preferred genre (having made
a previous purchase or set an explicit preference) other than the genre specific to the
offer. Regression results for all four variables are shown in Table 2.11.
Table 2.11: Effect of Targeted Offers on Post-Offer Purchasing
Purchased Purchased Purchased
New Any Target Preferred
Genre Purchase Genre Genre
Offer x -0.0106* -0.0097 -0.0051 0.0042
Targeted (0.0050) (0.0090) (0.0052) (0.0068)
0.0114* 0.013 6t 0.0091* -0.0055
(0.0046) (0.0081) (0.0044) (0.0066)
Targeted -0.0032 -0.0226** 0.0061 -0.0253**(0.0053) (0.0087) (0.0051) (0.0066)
t Different from zero, p < 0.10; * different from zero, p < 0.05; ** different
from zero, p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Note: Sample includes all active customers in four largest genre-targeted
campaigns (N = 25,164).
When not receiving an offer, the two groups were equally likely to purchase tickets
to a genre they had not previously purchased (see Figure 2-3). The non-targeted group
is more likely to buy from a new genre when receiving the offer, while the targeted
group is not. This result is consistent with the prediction that targeted offers result
in less broadening of purchasing patterns. This implies that if a retailer considers
it important to diversify across categories at the customer level, targeted offers that
evoke the customer's preferred category come at the cost of less diversification. One
reason this is particularly important for StubHub is that the genres tend to be very
seasonal, and allowing customers to remain inactive for large parts of the year could
hurt retention.
The targeted group is more likely to purchase the target genre, but their purchas-
ing of the target genre is less responsive to the offer. This could be due to satiation, as
they were already more likely to purchase tickets for their favored genre in the hold-
out group, but could also reflect differences between the targeted and non-targeted
groups. As with the wine study, the parameter of interest is an interaction, so the
estimates will require that the targeted buyers' response to the offers does not differ
from that of non-targeted buyers for reasons other than their genre preference.
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Figure 2-3: Unmatched and Matched Estimates of Offer Response
To supplement the conventional (OLS) estimates of the targeting effect, an alterna-
tive analysis was performed using propensity score matching, with pre-test measures
as covariates. Table B.6 in the Appendix compares several pre-test measures for the
customers coded as targeted and not targeted, for matched and unmatched data.
The non-targeted customers appear to have made more purchases and purchased
more recently than the targeted customers, suggesting that the retailer used a selec-
tion rule for eligibility with a higher threshold of past purchasing if the customer's
genre preferences did not match the offer. The matching procedure greatly reduced
the differences in pre-test measures; the matching estimates are reported in Table B.7.
The results confirm the initial analysis: the targeted group is less likely to purchase
from a new genre. Furthermore, to the extent that there were unobserved differences
correlated with the pre-test measures, we would expect the coefficients of interest to
change in magnitude, but the estimates were remarkably similar (as expected, the
baseline purchasing for the targeted customers was higher after matching).
An alternative method of controlling for customer differences is to estimate average
purchase rates for each customer, using a fixed effects model. This requires multiple
observations per customer, so the analysis pools data from all 51 campaigns, 13 of
which were genre-specific. Fixed effects are included to control for different purchase
rates for each campaign and user. Interaction terms are used to estimate the effect
of the offer separately for genre-specific campaigns, and for the difference in response
between targeted and non-targeted customers (again, the Offer x Targeted interaction
term). The customer fixed effects control for any customer characteristics that are
not time-varying. The estimates from the fixed effects approach are shown in Table
B.8, in the Appendix. As before, customers were less likely to purchase from new
genres after receiving a targeted offer.
2.4.3 Discussion
StubHub's email campaigns were not specifically designed to isolate the effects of
targeted offers that are tailored to customers' previous purchases. While some of
the eligible customers had not previously purchased from the offered genres, these
customers may have been selected for their high response rates. For robustness, two
Purchased New Genre Purchased Target Genre
different econometric approaches were used to account for potential selection bias,
with similar outcomes.
The results show that customers receiving targeted offers were less likely to go on
to purchase tickets in genres that they had not previously purchased. This finding
supports the prediction that targeted offers restrict the diversification of sales at the
customer level. This also contradicts the hypothesis that a targeted offer increases
search efficiency without sacrificing the benefits of additional search. While the search
process is not observed directly, the purchasing patterns suggest that customers were
less likely to consider and evaluate new products following targeted offers.
2.5 General Discussion and Conclusion
The evidence from these field experiments shows how targeted offers affect customer
search behavior. A targeted offer generated more interest in the offer, but also resulted
in less overall search activity. While search spillovers may be present, they appear to
be small relative to the limiting effect of targeted offers on non-directed, exploratory
search. Previous research (Moe, 2003; Brynjolfsson, Hu, and Simester, 2011) has
focused on characterizing non-directed search and showing how it can influence pur-
chasing patterns; this study shows how targeted offers can affect the occurrence of
non-directed search.
Exploratory search can affect the diversity of customer-level sales, an important
consideration for some retailers. Customers receiving a targeted offer were less likely
to purchase products from new categories, supporting the claim that targeted of-
fers narrow the scope of search. From the retailer's perspective, there are a variety
of benefits from increased customer search. Since customers seeking information on
products also learn about their shopping environment, "cognitive lock-in" can increase
loyalty as customers develop affinity for a website, effectively creating switching costs
for the customer (Johnson, Bellman, and Lohse, 2003). Also, due to limited band-
width of marketing communications, high-quality firms might prefer that customers
search for more information on their own (Mayzlin and Shin, 2011). Less informative
advertising (such as image advertising, or perhaps less aggressively targeted commu-
nications) could signal high quality to the customer, making it worth their while to
seek additional information.
There is also the question of whether or not additional search is desirable for
consumers. A common finding in experiments on sequential search is that people tend
to search too little compared to normative models. This may be particularly true
when incremental search costs are low (Zwick, Rapoport, Lo, and Muthukrishnan,
2003). Studies of online search behavior tend to confirm the tendency for search to be
surprisingly limited, given the relative ease of shopping online (Johnson, Moe, Fader,
Bellman, and Lohse, 2004). Other research has shown that customers are unlikely
to look many steps ahead when searching, and are unlikely to explore riskier options
(Gabaix, Laibson, Moloche, and Weinberg, 2006). In contrast, normative models
prescribe investigating higher variance options first (Weitzman, 1979). Analogously,
initiating customer contact with a targeted offering could be suboptimal, because
high-variance options go unexplored. Thus, at least in some circumstances, consumers
could make better choices by searching more.
While running their day-to-day operations, managers naturally develop tactics
that maximize the immediate, visible response: sales. Targeting customers based on
their historical purchasing can help balance the drive to maximize sales with the draw-
backs of overwhelming customers with information. However, targeting can have the
unanticipated effect of curtailing search activity by weakening customers' incentives
to take an active role in search. Given the unpredictability of supply and instability of
customers' preferences, it is important that retailers provide customers with appeals
that encourage them to search, and evaluate a wider range of products. These find-
ings imply that retailers should balance the need for immediate sales response with
measures that sustain customer interest and engagement through diverse offerings.
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Appendix A
Exclusion Restriction Sensitivity
Analysis
To illustrate how the exclusion restriction might fail, and how this would affect the IV
estimates, we performed a sensitivity analysis. This approach is described by Angrist,
Imbens, and Rubin (1996). To provide a framework for this analysis, we relax the
exclusion restriction, allowing cost C to affect quantity as in the equation below (we
restrict our attention to wholesale price, since the exclusion restriction is more of a
concern with this variable). The sensitivity parameters, f/, represent the correlation
between the cost variable and the error term when the exclusion restriction is imposed
(Equation 1.4). The interpretation of -y depends on the posited source of endogeneity.
In Qjt = #NB (In Pit x national brandi) + pPL (In Pit x private label;)
+ 7yNB (In Cit x national brandi) + _YPL (ln Cit x private label;) + pai + 6t + sit
(A.1)
One potential source of endogeneity is simultaneity, where unobserved changes in
demand affect wholesale prices. If positive demand shocks lead to higher costs, this
would induce a positive bias in the cost coefficient in a reduced-form regression of
quantity on cost. Since price and cost are positively correlated (as in the first stage
regression), this results in a positive bias in IV estimates of P. Thus, a simultaneity
problem most likely would result in positive values of -Y. To the extent that national
brand manufacturers have high bargaining power relative to private label manufac-
turers, this parameter is likely to be larger for national brands. To the extent that
private label manufacturers sell a customized product to the retailer, and can more
easily price discriminate, y could be larger for private labels, but this scenario seems
less likely.
Another possible source of endogeneity is if cost affects demand via a causal path
other than a product's own price. If higher costs cause the retailer to increase prices
on substitute products, positive cross-elasticities would produce an upwards shift in
demand, implying a positive value of -y. Similarly, if higher costs cause the retailer
to decrease prices on complementary products, negative cross-elasticities would also
produce an upwards shift in demand.
Besanko, Dub6 and Gupta (2005) found evidence of cross-brand wholesale price
pass-through that was more likely to be positive for private label wholesale prices,
implying - is larger (more positive) for private labels. In our historical data, a regres-
sion of prices on competitive costs has a different pattern: national brand costs have a
larger effect on private label prices (a coefficient of 0.36) than vice-versa (a coefficient
of 0.05). Possible explanations for this difference are different retailer pricing policies,
or the inclusion of trade promotions, though Dub6 and Gupta (2008) did not notice
any systematic differences between regular price and promotional weeks.
With these explanations in mind for why the cost variable could violate the exclu-
sion restriction, we estimate Equation A.1 for several fixed values of -y. We benchmark
-y relative to the magnitude of the OLS pass-through estimates. The multipliers in
the far right column are based on 3SLS estimates of cross-price elasticities. The
corresponding adjusted price elasticity estimates are reported in Table A.1.
Table A.1: IV Estimates Given Fixed Values of Gamma
NB -0.5 x PT 0 0.5 x PT 1 x PT 0.29 x PT
7PL -0.5 x PT 0 0.5 x PT 1 x PT 0.58 x PT
National -0.96** -1.19** -1.44** -1.67** -1.34**
Brand (0.21) (0.21) (0.19) (0.19) (0.20)
Private -0.04 -0.16 -0.31 -0.42 -0.33
Label (0.33) (0.32) (0.30) (0.29) (0.30)
Difference p < 0.05 p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01 p < 0.01
* Significantly different from zero, p < 0.05
** Significantly different from zero, p < 0.01
Standard errors in parentheses, clustered on item and week.
PT is an OLS estimate of cross-brand pass-through of wholesale price.
The estimates for likely values of 7 provide a rough sense of the extent to which
violations of the exclusion restriction might bias the results. We can see that intuitive
explanations for such violations result in a minimal qualitative impact on the elasticity
estimates. This analysis is reassuring, but does not allow us to conduct inference; each
estimate assumes that 7 is known, and the standard errors are relatively unaffected.
As an extension of this sensitivity analysis, we used an informative prior distribu-
tion on y to construct confidence intervals accounting for uncertainty in the exclusion
restriction. Conley, Hansen, and Rossi (2010) recommend this approach for situations
where the instruments are 'plausible.' They offer wholesale price as an instrument for
retail price as an example where such a procedure would be appropriate. In this sec-
tion, we apply their method of constructing confidence intervals under the assumption
that -y (as parameterized in Equation A. 1) is near zero, rather than exactly zero.
A normal prior for y results in an analytical approximation for the asymptotic
variance of the estimates, which assumes a known distribution for -/. The method is
named for the "local-to-zero" (LTZ) assumption used to compute the approximation.
Uncertainty about 7 is of the same order of magnitude as sampling error, so that
neither source of error dominates the estimator's asymptotic behavior.
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Figure A-1: LTZ Confidence Intervals for - ~ N (0, 232)
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Figure A-2: LTZ Confidence Intervals for 7 - N (0, 2/32)
Following Conley, Hansen, and Rossi (2010), Figure A-1 shows price elasticity
confidence intervals indexed by a parameter J, where -y is distributed N (0,622),
and Figure A-2 shows confidence intervals for the difference between national brands
and private labels. The components of y are assumed to be independent (a positive
correlation would result in narrower confidence intervals). The difference between the
parameters is significantly different from zero until two standard deviations of -y span
nearly 50% of P. A mean shift in the prior for -y would result in a mean shift in the
adjusted estimates for #, as in Table A.1. The sensitivity analysis suggests that the
difference in price sensitivity between private labels and national brands is robust to
minor violations in the validity of the exclusion restriction.
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Appendix B
Supplementary Tables and Figures
Table B.1: Variable Descriptions for Wine Store Browsing Data
Description
Opened Email
Email Views
Visited Site
Page Views
Feature Views
Browse/Search
> 50% Search
Cart/Account
Ordered
Auctions
Other Pages
Viewed at least one email during the session
Number of email views, measured by hits on tracking image
Viewed at least one website page during the session
Number of website page views
Page views for features and promotions
Page views including browsing, searches, and product pages
At least 50% of session page views classified as browse/search
Page views involving cart activity and account management
Placed an order through the website
Page views of auction section of site
Page views for home page, company information, etc.
Variable
Table B.2: Summary Statistics for Wine Store Browsing Data
Variable Mean Std Dev Min 9 9 th Pctl. Max
Opened Email 68.2% 46.6% 0 1 1
Email Views 1.00 1.51 0 6 154
Visited Site 40.0% 49.0% 0 1 1
Page Views 2.63 11.75 0 41 800
Feature Views 0.33 1.27 0 5 66
Browse/Search 0.74 5.98 0 14 424
> 50% Search 7.32% 26.0% 0 1 1
Cart/Account 0.41 2.88 0 8 310
Ordered 0.34% 5.81% 0 0 1
Auctions 0.81 8.11 0 18 798
Other Pages 0.34 1.60 0 5 158
Note: Sample includes all sessions for a 17-day
Sessions defined through analysis of IP address
30 minutes marked the end a session).
period (N = 110,772).
and timing (a delay of
Table B.3: Pre-Test Measures, Treatment (FR) and
Control (CA) Offers
FR Offer CA Offer Difference
FR Amount 1,076.4 1,119.4 (1435.3)
FR Bottles 34.1 32.3 1.81(3.15)
US Amount 132.6 130.7 1.89(20.07)
US Bottles 4.68 5.23 0.6547(0.616)
Browse/Search 0.154 0.226 -0.071
Views (0.107)
Orders 0.002 0.001 0.001
Placed (0.002)
N 1,031 1,046
at least $400 of
Standard errors in parentheses.
Note: Sample includes Customers who bought
either French or Italian wine (but not both).
Table B.4: Control Variable Coefficients
Browse/Search Test Offer Test Offer
Views Views Sales
Standard.
Avg. Price
FR Offer x
FR Buyer x Avg. Price
FR Buyer x
Price
FR Offer x
Price
Standard.
Bottles
FR Offer x
FR Buyer x Bottles
FR Buyer x
Bottles
FR Offer x
Bottles
Standard.
Amount
FR Offer x
FR Buyer x
FR Buyer x
Amount
FR Offer x
Amount
Amount
-0.0228
(0.0184)
0.2429
(0.1778)
0.0408
(0.0298)
-0.2541
(0.1761)
-0.0105
(0.0233)
0.2141
(0.2563)
0.1012
(0.0732)
-0.3007
(0.2468)
0.0139
(0.0173)
-0.2218
(0.2030)
-0.0394
(0.0420)
0.2419
(0.1993)
-0.0081
(0.0063)
-0.0130
(0.0104)
0.0059
(0.0066)
0.0040
(0.0075)
-0.0018
(0.0130)
0.0178
(0.0183)
0.0021
(0.0130)
-0.0095
(0.0143)
0.0011
(0.0092)
0.0151
(0.0350)
-0.0013
(0.0092)
0.0071**
(0.0106)
0.0000
(0.0000)
-1.7465
(2.2754)
0.0000
(0.0000)
-0.7054
(0.5658)
0.0000
(0.0000)
2.2642
(3.4393)
0.0000
(0.0000)
-0.9927
(0.7767)
0.0000
(0.0000)
7.3669
(11.9022)
0.0000
(0.0000)
1.0258
(0.7535)
t Different from zero, p < 0.10; * different from zero, p < 0.05; ** different from
zero, p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Note: Sample includes customers who bought $400 of either French or Italian wine
(N = 2,077). Estimates are of control variable coefficients for targeting response
regressions (see Table 2.3).
Table B.5: Pre-test Measures of Transaction Activity
Offer No Offer Difference
Previous 2.60 2.64 (0.04
Orders (0.08)
Previous -0.08
Quantity (0.24)
Amount -10.8
Per Order (8.11)
Days Since 386.2 391.8 -5.53
Last Order (5.82)
# of Genre -0.02
Preferences (0.01)
0.00Targeted 0.72 0.72 0.00
(0.01)
N 22,624 2,540
Standard errors in parentheses.
Note: "No Offer" group was a randomly assigned holdout (received
no email). Historical ordering is summed over all transactions prior
to the start of the offer. Days since last order is the number of days
since most recent purchase until the start date of the offer. Number of
genre preferences indicates the number of different genres in which the
customer has made a purchase as of the offer start date. "Targeted"
group consisted of customers who previously made a purchase in the
genre targeted by a campaign for which the customer was eligible.
Table B.6: Matching Targeted Customers on Pre-test Measures
Unmatched Pre-test Differences Matched Pre-test Differences
Not Not
Targeted Targeted Difference Targeted Targeted Difference
Previous 3.43 2.28 1.15** 3.41 3.40 0.01
Orders (0.055) (0.093)
Previous 9.46 6.15 3.31** 9.42 9.46 -0.04
Quantity (0.16) (0.29)
Amount -6.88 2.84Amont335.0 341.9 -. 8 335.0 332.2 28
Per Order (5.42) (6.31)
Days Since -112.7** 8.48f
Last Order (3.84) (4.49)
# of Genre 1.25 1.28 -0.04** 1.25 1.28 -0.03**
Preferences (0.009) (0.011)
Offer -0.001 0.0002
.fe 0.90 0.90 -001 0.90 0.90 000
Condition (0.004) (0.005)
N 7,093 18,071 7,088 18,071
t Different from zero, p < 0.10; * different from zero, p < 0.05; ** different from zero, p < 0.01.
Standard errors in parentheses.
Note: "Targeted" group consisted of customers who previously made a purchase in the genre
targeted by a campaign for which the customer was eligible. Matched data is reweighted using
kernel matching on propensity scores. Propensity scores were estimated using a probit regression
on previous orders, quantity, days since last order, and number of genre preferences indicated for
each customer as of the offer start date. For distribution of propensity scores see Figure B-1.
Matching used an Epanechnikov kernel with bandwidth of 0.025, on common support (chosen
for covariate balance; other kernels, bandwidths, and nearest-neighbor matching produced similar
results).
Targeted A Targeted B Targeted, C Targeted, D
0 agtd Targeted. B Targeted, C Targeted, D
Predicted P(Not Targeted)
VM Density
Kernel Density
Graphs by Customers and Campaign
Figure B-1: Propensity Scores by Customer Preference for Targeted Genre
Note: Propensities are predicted using probit regression of untargeted status (i.e. customer does
not have a preference for the targeted genre) on historical orders, quanitity, days since last
purchase, and number of genre preferences as of the beginning of the promotional period.
Histogram has a bin size of 0.05, and density is estimated using an Epanechnikov kernel with a
bandwidth of 0.025.
Table B.7: Matching Estimates of Targeting Response
Purchased Purchased Purchased
New Any Target Preferred
Genre Purchase Genre Genre
Offer x -0.0138* -0.0042 -0.0012 0.0096f
Targeted (0.0058) (0.0094) (0.0056) (0.0054)
0.0115** 0.0133* 0.0090* -0.0058
(0.0041) (0.0067) (0.0039) (0.0039)
.0095t 0.0020 0.0155** -0.0219**
(0.0055) (0.0089) (0.0053) (0.0052)
t Different from zero, p < 0.10; * different from zero, p < 0.05; ** different
from zero, p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Note: Weighted sample of active customers in four largest genre-targeted
campaigns (N = 25,159).
Not Targeted; A Not Targeted, B Not Targeted, C Not -Targeted, D
Table B.8: Regressions With Customer Fixed Effects
Purchased Purchased Purchased
New Any Target Preferred
Genre Purchase Genre Genre
Offer x -0.0153* -0.0124 -0.0099* 0.0081
Targeted (0.0064) (0.0088) (0.0047) (0.0053)
Offer x Genre 0.0131* 0.0127t 0.0118** -0.0084t
Specific (0.0058) (0.0077) (0.0037) (0.0047)
Offer x Other -0.0007 0.0033 -0.0012 0.0057
Campaigns (0.0033) (0.0050) (0.0015) (0.0037)
0.0439** 0.0349** 0.0125** -0.0178**
(0.0068) (0.0089) (0.0047) (0.0052)
t Different from zero, p < 0.10; * different from zero, p < 0.05; ** different from
zero, p < 0.01. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
Note: Sample includes campaigns with holdout groups that did not target specific
genres, for 51 campaigns altogether (N = 48,837). Includes fixed effects for each
campaign and for each customer. Dummy variable for targeted can only take the
value of 1 for genre-specific campaigns, so the 3-way interaction would be redundant.
"Other Campaigns" refers to campaigns that are not genre-specific.
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